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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this thesis is to highlight the challenges posed by the further 
development of the Hungarian Special Forces (HUNSF) and to provide a viable 
alternative for facilitating the consolidation. The study utilizes historical examples 
of Special Forces units, organizational design theory and statistical analysis of 
the empirical research of HUNSF’s bureaucratic environment. The key findings 
are that the challenges HUNSF faces show similarities with the evolution of other 
Special Forces and the challenges are in connection with the actual development 
stage of HUNSF as an organization. 
The analysis of the empirical research revealed that the permissiveness of 
the bureaucratic environment depends most on: the degree of military 
organizational value alignment between the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF) 
and HUNSF, and HUNSF’s perceived disrespect toward the HDF. Moreover, 
HUNSF, in its present stage of organizational evolution, must become more 
appreciative of its potentially accommodating bureaucratic environment; the 
current dependence on influential individual sponsors must be replaced by 
institutionalized sponsorship; for HUNSOF to become an enhanced HDF asset, 
the present special forces capacity must turned into a Special Operations Forces 
capacity on the tactical, operational and strategic level with adequate 
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The Hungarian Ministry of Defense (MoD) occupies a multi-story and 
rather unattractive building in the heart of the country’s otherwise pretty capital 
city. In early 2003, a handful of devoted military officers gathered in one of the 
offices of the MoD’s Operations and Training Department on the “0” floor, which 
was commonly referred as “The Vault.” Even though the Hungarian Defense 
Forces (HDF) were in the process of reorganization—which also meant the 
downsizing of the forces—these men were about to propose a new unit: a special 
forces (SF) battalion.1 Despite the downscaling, the HDF 34th László Bercsényi 
Special Forces Battalion (34th SF Battalion) was formed in September 2005 on 
the basis of the HDF 34th Reconnaissance Battalion, and it was almost 
immediately considered the HDF’s “elite unit.”2 
It has been seven years since that meeting in “The Vault” and nearly five 
since the formation of the 34th SF Battalion. Conceiving and bearing the “child” 
was challenging enough for some founders to lose, or at least abandon, their 
faith that their “infant” will ever become a young adult, let alone graduate college. 
Nevertheless, some exams have already been passed and graduation is 
scheduled for the end of 2010, when elements of the 34th SF Battalion will have 
                                            
1 Whereas it certainly took the effort of a group of dedicated individuals to create the tactical 
special forces capacity, the HDF comprehensive defense review, conducted in 2003, served as 
the legal basis for the establishment of the 34th SF Battalion. 
 
Imre Porkoláb, A különleges műveleti erők szerepe az aszimmetrikus kihívásokból adódó katonai 
feladatok tükrében, különös tekintettel a nemzetközi terrorizmus elleni küzdelemre (The role of 
special operations forces in asymmetric military threats, specifically in the struggle against 
transnational terrorism), PhD Dissertation, Hadtudományi Iskola, Zrínyi Miklós Nemzetvédelmi 
Egyetem (Budapest: Zrínyi Miklós Nemzetvédelmi Egyetem, 2008), 3. 
2  Honvédelmi Minisztérium Magyar Honvédség, MH 34. Bercsényi László Különleges 
Műveleti Zászlóalj (HDF 34th Special Forces Battalion), March 15, 2005, 
http://www.hm.gov.hu/honvedseg/mh_34._bercsenyi_laszlo_kulonleges_muveleti_zaszloalj 
(accessed February 3, 2010). 
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to meet NATO’s criteria for Special Operations Forces3 and have an able and 
deployable Special Operations Task Group.4 By then a number of the 34th SF 
Battalion’s existing Special Operations Task Units5 (SOTU) will also have had 
combat experience, as one at a time it is deployed in Afghanistan as part of the 
International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF) SOCCE6 Kabul. Also, as an 
effort to boost national and allied SF capacity, in February 2010, the HDF 
launched the NATO Special Forces Qualification Course, which is the very first 
such course to take place in Europe—or anywhere else outside the United 
States, for that matter. 
 
 
                                            
3 These criteria are formalized in the MoD’s Force Proposals to the NATO (reference No. EL 
0035) and the NATO Special Operations Headquarters’ (NSHQ) SOFEVAL Criteria document. 
 
Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Hungary, The Republic of Hungary's Force Proposals to 
the NATO, reference No. EL 0035 (Budapest: Ministry of Defense, 2007). 
4 “Special Operations Task Group: (1) A SOTG is a national grouping of SOF that is 
employed to conduct special operations as directed by the commander CJFSOCC. A SOTG can 
be land or maritime oriented and is normally composed of: (a) A HQ that is capable of conducting 
the J1-J6 staff functions; (b) Subordinate SOTUs; (c) CS units; and (d) CSS elements.” 
 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations AJP-3.5 (NATO 
Standardization Agency, 2008), 3–4. 
5 “A SOTU is the lowest level of a SOF tactical level combat element that deploys by air, 
land, or sea and is able to conduct SR, DA, or MA. A SOTU is normally comprised of 4–16 
personnel, and should be capable of split-team operations.” 
 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations AJP-3.5 (NATO 
Standardization Agency, 2008), 3–5. 
6 “Special Operations Command and Control Element. When SOF operate directly in the 
area of operations (AOO) of conventional forces, or when the likelihood of integrated or 
converging operations with conventional forces is probable in a JOA, the CJFSOCC commander 
may establish a special operations command and control element (SOCCE) to synchronize, 
deconflict, and coordinate operations with conventional forces. The SOCCE will normally 
collocate with the appropriate-level conventional force HQ (maritime or land), and may exercise 
control of affected SOF.” The ISAF SOF command, control and coordination element is being 
restructured with the intent of unifying NATO and U.S. forces into a CJFSOCC in accordance with 
the above definition. 
 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations AJP-3.5 (NATO 
Standardization Agency, 2008), 3–5. 
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After the uncertain start amid the downsizing of the HDF, the 34th SF 
Battalion that represents the Hungarian Special Forces (HUNSF) capacity seems 
to be on track, although the consolidation of this capacity may prove to be even 
more challenging than the creation itself. 
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
This thesis hopes to guide the construction of a permanent permissive 
environment for HUNSF development and deployment. The major causes for the 
current rather restrictive environment for HUNSF development and upkeep will 
be determined and analyzed; then the implied, and more important, issue will be 
addressed:  What would a permissive environment look like and how can it be 
created? The ultimate goal of the current study is to highlight the utility of a 
special operations capability for the HDF and, thereby, enhance Hungary’s 
capacity to pursue its national and allied interests more effectively—
acknowledging that the former is yet to be formalized as a clear national strategy. 
In an era that was characterized by force reduction, HUNSF emerged as a 
bottom-up type capability with all the accompanying advantages and challenges. 
The 34th SF Battalion enjoyed considerable freedom in the process of creating 
its organization and forming the culture associated with it. Until recently, HUNSF 
also had substantial and direct access to otherwise scarce resources to facilitate 
the formation of the 34th SF Battalion. These traits, however, came with a price. 
The founding fathers of HUNSF were preoccupied solely with the 
tremendous task of establishing a new unit. The founders’ attention was also 
focused on the shaping of a certain fraction—some very influential sponsors—of 
the strategic political and military environment. On the latter, HUNSF, as an 
entirely new and unprecedented capacity, was enormously dependent for 
support. This largely inward-looking approach was probably both unavoidable 
and necessary in the initial phase of HUNSF development. Self-assertion was 
even more reinforced by a partly self-imposed protective secrecy that generally 
tends to surround such forces. The very secrecy and introspective attitude that 
 4
helped facilitate and protect the birth of the unit, however, seems to have caused 
some adverse consequences due to Hungary’s military and political leadership’s 
general lack of understanding about SOF and special operations. 
Special operations, their military and political utility, and discrete mission 
are inadequately understood in the HDF. Even the relatively small Hungarian 
SOF-community tends to disagree on these fundamental issues. It is not 
surprising then that the Hungarian special forces growth appears to have been 
met with skepticism and, sometimes, outright hostility from the larger military. 
Some of these concerns are almost certainly unavoidable and universal rather 
that HUNSF-specific. Nevertheless, HUNSF’s relative isolation and the 
skepticism directed at it seem to prove just how critical is the attitude 
stakeholders possess about HUNSF’s utility in the preservation, development 
and deployment of HUNSF. On the other hand, HUNSF’s attitude toward its 
immediate operating environment is of equal importance. 
C. HYPOTHESES 
To answer the above-stated main research question regarding the major 
causes for the current, rather restrictive environment for HUNSF development, 
two hypotheses have been developed. The first concerns the exposure of non-
SF personnel to SF and special operations, and the second relates to these two 
groups’ preferences in military organizational values. The first hypothesis 
captures the extent to which non-SF HDF personnel are exposed to HUNSF from 
an operational, educational and organizational point of view.  The second 
assumption describes the level of consistency in the non-SF HDF personnel’s 
military organizational values and the ones they assign to HUNSF. 
The first hypothesis assumes that the relevant HDF personnel’s 
operational, educational and organizational exposure to HUNSF and special 
operations has a positive effect on the permissiveness of the bureaucratic 
environment in which HUNSF operates. The hypothesis also presumes that both 
the HDF’s and HUNSF’s relative attitude towards one another becomes more 
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favorable, given that they increasingly interact with each other. It is also 
presumed that this interaction increases HUNSF’s perceived (military) utility. 
The second hypothesis concerns military organizational values. The 
assumption is that the more overlapped the military organizational traits are 
between the HDF and HUNSF, the more favorable the abovementioned 
dependent variables become for HUNSF development and upkeep. Absolutely 
no alignment, from HUNSF’s perspective, means slight or nil chances for 
cooperation, whereas a closer alignment indicates that the bureaucratic 
environment is potentially receptive. 
Of the individual independent variables, operational exposure concerns 
the operational (combat theatre) experience of the relevant HDF personnel. The 
assumption is that the more such experience individuals accumulate, especially 
when it includes working with national or other SOF, the more likely they are to 
develop a positive attitude toward, and a general understanding of, HUNSF. 
 
Table 1.   Simplified model of variables and causal mechanism  
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The educational segment of the same independent variable is presumed 
to have the same causal mechanism. Since special operations and special forces 
are recent virtues of the Hungarian military, the present strategic decision 
makers, and those who prepare and assist decisions on the strategic and 
operational level, are neither well educated nor particularly familiar with special 
forces and special operations. Whereas this statement is not intended to be 
offensive, it is assumed that the information this group possesses about SOF in 
general, and SF in particular, is often fractious, distorted, and superficial. Until 
the time when HUNSF becomes adequately established and represented in the 
HDF, and the latter gains practical experience through exposure to HUNSF, 
education and perception management will be key in gaining at least the passive 
support of the conventional military and the active support of at least some of the 
politico-military stakeholders, decision makers and managers. HUNSF must bring 
itself into a position where it can provide advice for the strategic decision makers 
and SOF education for the operational management structure. 
The other set of independent variables stresses the importance and 
probable effect of organizational values and cultures. The hypothetical model 
supposes that the more closely aligned the general military organizational values 
are to those that the conventional military believes to be the values of HUNSF, 
the more favorably the former sees HUNSF in terms of the dependent variables 
depicted in Table 1. This causation is presumed to create a more permissive 
environment for HUNSF. 
HUNSF’s current organizational culture and its assumed despise of the 
conventional military, along with its perceived or actual elitism,7 are believed to 
feed the skepticism of the Hungarian military towards HUNSF. This theory is 
addressed in a survey that was conducted as an element of this thesis research. 
                                            
7 In the context of this paper, the phrase elitism refers to the expressed conviction of 
individual members or groups of HUNSF that those individuals or groups, or the cause they stand 
for, deserve a favored treatment compared to the other branches of the military by the virtue of 
their perceived superiority in intellect, training, equipment, experience, appearance, etc. This 
definition is based on The Free Dictionary, Elitism, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/elitism 
(accessed February 3, 2010). 
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The background of the hypothesis is that the 34th SF Battalion was created on 
the base of a conventional, though “elite regular,” unit. The personnel of that unit 
also provided the majority of the personnel for the 34th SF Battalion and, even 
though the fluctuation rate has been considerable, the organizational culture has 
been continuous in this regard. The struggle to have a sufficient number of 
operators, political and military sponsors, and sufficient resources to develop the 
new unit, along with the dubious quality of the assessment and selection of 
personnel, seem to have resulted in HUNSF’s perceived or actual elitist attitude 
in lieu of ethos. This attitude is thought to have been the major source of 
resentment in the conventional military toward HUNSF. 
The resentment of HUNSF by the conventional military has been holding 
back the full development of a special operations capability for Hungary. This 
dislike, however, might well be mitigated by increased exposure of HUNSF to 
HDF, extensive inter-branch cooperation and turning the current SF model into a 
broader SOF capacity (“SOFization”). The inward-looking organizational culture 
and the self-defined special status need to be balanced out with the concept of 
profession, “where the conduct of [the organization’s] members is importantly 
influenced by an external reference group of fellow specialists who prescribe 
training, evaluate practice, and set standards.”8 Since HUNSF development has 
largely been one-sided from the outset (focused on merely the tactical level 
capacity), SOF-trained facilitators are almost entirely missing at the operational 
and strategic level. The selection, training and education of such personnel are of 
key concern. Bureaucratic allies must be sought out and educated that a SOF 
capacity is crucial in today’s threat environment and will be a valued partner with 
the conventional force. 
This “liaison” program needs to enjoy the full consent of HUNSF and other 
potential SOF elements in order to build the necessary rapport for these “fellow 
specialist.” The role of such a supportive group in higher headquarters is vital 
                                            
8 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it, New 
Edition, 2000 (Basic Books, Inc., 1989), 149. 
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especially until the current HUNSF is turned into a special operations capacity 
that can provide qualified personnel at the operational and strategic levels in 
sufficient numbers. The importance of such “SOF bureaucrats” will not be 
lessened by the SOFization of the current HUNSF, but the dependence on them 
will somewhat decrease. 
The development of HUNSF also highlights differences between the 
organizational cultures of the Special Forces in general and the conventional 
military. The subsequent disagreement on preferences create tensions that result 
in a less permissive environment for HUNSF development. The HDF has been 
undergoing significant modernization and a new military culture is most 
encouraged. The desired new military culture, that emphasizes a different 
approach to organizational culture by stressing effectiveness and preferring 
outcomes to outputs for instance,9 is more easily advanced within HUNSF. This 
is due to the facts that the size of HUNSF is substantially smaller than that of the 
conventional military and HUNSF began as a movement and retained some of 
the movement-like characteristics to date. Additionally, HUNSF intends to recruit 
personnel with a distinct mindset. If we add these to SF’s general “obsession” 
with efficiency and outcomes vs. the military bureaucracy’s perfectly reasonable 
fascination with process and outputs, the tension between organizational cultures 
is seemingly inescapable. 
D. TARGET AUDIENCE 
The dedication, boldness, innovativeness and, at times, stubbornness of 
the founders gave birth to the HDF 34th Special Forces Battalion—the special 
forces capacity on the tactical level. In the process, however, HUNSF has 
become too isolated from the environment in which it exists. HUNSF is, to some 
extent, a “legal alien,” as HUNSF has failed to adequately appreciate and 
completely adapt to its immediate domestic environment: the Hungarian Defense 
                                            
9  László Lakatos, "A Magyar Honvédség markáns változásai és jövője (The remarkable 
changes and the future of the HDF)," Új Honvédségi Szemle (HM Zrínyi Kommunikációs 
Szolgáltató Kht. Médiaigazgatósága) LXI, no. 2007/5 (2007). 
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Forces. For this force to become a “legal resident,” a strategic asset for the HDF 
and the state, HUNSF and everyone associated with it need to adapt to and 
become an integral part of the immediate environment, the often-despised 
conventional military, while retaining its unique characteristics in the process. 
The transformation from what the current HUNSF considers SF to what is 
considered SOF will require some change in the paradigm and organizational 
culture that characterizes HUNSF. HUNSF, the 34th SF Battalion and those 
associated with HUNSF development, need to appreciate that the divide between 
conventional and unconventional thinking is that the latter can make the best use 
of any, not particularly accommodating, operating environment without turning 
that environment against self—and this ability is by no means limited to combat 
operations. 
To paraphrase Mao, HUNSF must move in the conventional bureaucratic 
environment as a fish swims in the sea. The Hungarian Defense Forces, the 
Joint Force Command and the Ministry of Defense are the chain of command 
and represent the immediate domestic operating environment for HUNSF. 
Appreciating this fact, rather than ignoring it, shaping the bureaucratic (command 
and control) relations and educating one another on issues that the other party is, 
for whatever reason, unfamiliar with is the constructive way forward for both 
HUNSF and HDF. Fighting the conventional bureaucracy instead of 
understanding and shaping it and failing to adapt would be very orthodox and, 
therefore, unacceptable from HUNSF as an unconventional asset. Resisting the 
benefits of having a highly capable special operations force would be an equally 
counterproductive approach by the Hungarian Defense Forces. Thinking that the 
parties concerned are likely to willingly engage in cooperation, initiate and 
implement certain (organizational) changes and appreciate one another just for 
the beauty of it is most likely a delusion. Personal and organizational incentives 
need to be provided and channeled through the HDF’s command and control 
relationships—though not necessarily through the ones that are currently in 
place. Therefore, the desired target audience of this study is chiefly what 
 10
Mintzberg would call the middle line and the strategic apex10 of the Joint Force 
Command and the Ministry of Defense, as well as the so-called SOF community, 
since the latter is just as much “guilty of ignorance” as they like to think 
“conventional bureaucracy” is.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The thesis utilizes empirical research, historical examples, and 
organizational design theory. Historical examples are used to describe the stages 
of SOF development to identify the most likely difficulties HUNSOF is likely to 
face or has already gone through. Historical examples are also intended to 
highlight the possible adverse effects of a less than optimal operating 
environment for SOF. Basic organizational design theory is used to understand 
how the operating environment of a bureaucracy influences the appropriateness 
of a structure and to draw attention to the built-in limitations of any bureaucratic 
organization. 
The data that have been collected via empirical research will be explained 
and analyzed by both statistical and qualitative methods in order to address the 
applicability of the hypotheses. The goal of the analysis is also to identify the 
most significant factors that, if addressed adequately, can realistically contribute 
to a more permissive operating environment for HUNSF, both in terms of its 
development and employment. 
                                            
10 Henry Mintzberg, "Organization design: Fashion or Fit?" Harvard Business Review 
(Harvard Business Publishing), January-February 1981, 3. 
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II. DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS 
The relevant results of the empirical research that was conducted as part 
this research effort show that there is little agreement on just what special forces 
and special operations are and what differentiates them form other forces. 
Additionally, in her book on U.S. Special Forces evolution, Marquis notes that 
“[t]he American military has traditionally been disdainful of anything considered 
elite or special.”11 Since the empirical research indicates similar trends in the 
HDF, the issue of “specialness” and the basics of special operations and special 
forces are described in this chapter. 
A. WHAT MAKES SPECIAL FORCES SPECIAL? 
There are several schools of thought for the definition of both special 
forces and special operations. Marquis stresses that a “conventional 
commander—understandably—is often offended and even outraged” when he is 
“faced with the individualistic, rank-unconscious, questioning special operator 
[…].”12 Understanding that such occasions cannot be completely eliminated and 
the criteria for special forces are not universal, as they can and do change 
country by country with varying degree of overlap, there are explicit traits that 
make special operators and special operations special. 
Even though special is a relative term and, as such, needs to be 
understood within a certain context, the distinction between special and non-
special appears to be far too simple to make in terms of military forces: Anyone 
who passes the Special Forces Assessment criteria, meets the objective 
standards for selection,13 and who successfully completes the training 
                                            
11 Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare-Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 4. 
12 Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare-Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 4. 
13 Assessment concerns personal traits, whereas selection generally focuses on physical 
attributes like fitness, stamina, etc. 
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requirements set forth by Special Forces is considered special. Whether this 
special status achieves external recognition is contingent, not only on facts, but 
on the perceptions of the “non-specials.” Simply put, the more demanding and 
the more appreciated the objective standards for selection, assessment and 
training, the more legitimate the distinction between those who have met the 
requirements and those who have not or have not even tried. 
Since the legitimacy of special forces and their members is both internal 
and external, the latter requires the standards of the selection, assessment and 
training process to be appreciated by the external stakeholders. This audience 
must also be under the impression that the standards are applied fairly, 
regardless of age, gender, military rank or position, etc. The relevance of external 
stakeholders’ perceptions may vary, as it is probably less of a concern in 
militaries where Special Forces have a decent amount of autonomy and a proven 
track record within the military forces.14 Where this autonomy and reputation is 
non-existent or negligible, the external stakeholders’ attitude toward Special 
Forces is of significant importance. Such is the case with HUNSF. 
In summation, there is, or there can be, a distinct divide between special 
forces and non-special forces soldiers, though for the special status to be 
considered legitimate—or achieved as sociology puts it, as opposed to self-
declared or ascribed—this status must have both internal and external 
legitimacy. The term special, nonetheless, seems to be most meaningful from the 
perspective of the individuals who make up Special Forces. Although those 
individuals matter most when it comes to Special Forces, one also ought to be 
concerned with the tasks that group performs as an organization. 
                                            
14 Autonomy is understood here based on Selznick’s definition: “a condition of independence 
sufficient to permit a group to work out and maintain a distinctive identity.” The implication is that 
the given group has sufficient leverage, representation, access to resources, etc. 
 
Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration in James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What government 
agencies do and why they do it, New Edition, 2000 (Basic Books, Inc., 1989), 182. 
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B. SPECIAL OPERATIONS VS. CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS 
Amid the current major military engagements where the enemy refuses to 
fight in accordance with Clausewitz’s principles and the traditional military 
manuals’ regulations, conventional operations and conventional mindset tend to 
appear in an ever-negative context. “Conventional” seems to have become a 
synonym for rigid, ineffective and unable to adapt, whereas special operations 
often appear as the Silver Bullet. This observation is, however, overly simplistic. 
These forces are meant to perform different tasks due to skill sets not widely held 
in the conventional force. Whether they perform them well is independent from 
the labeling of the forces. 
1. Popular False Perceptions of Special Operations 
Porkoláb and Bári, in their NPS thesis, noted that—based on the U.S. 
Special Operations Command’s definition for special operations—“SF are special 
because they have unique equipment and conduct tasks that exceed the routine 
capabilities of General Purpose Forces (the tasks and methods being, by 
implication, conventional).”15 While this is far from what the two authors came up 
with as conclusion, this notion of special operations being the net result of better 
hardware and enhanced training is extremely popular and it is also frequently 
used to denounce the legitimacy of special forces and special operations.16 
Another popular view of special operations can be summarized by what 
Vice Admiral William H. McRaven17 emphasizes in his book titled Spec Ops. 
McRaven declares that “[r]elative superiority is a concept key to the theory of 
                                            
15 Imre Porkoláb and Gábor Bári, Enhancing national security in Hungary through the 
development and employment of Special Forces, MSc Thesis, Defense Analysis Department, 
Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 46. 
16 The argument usually goes that, provided with equal opportunity in terms of training and 
access to equipment, any conventional force could be considered special and able to conduct 
special operations. Even though there is some truth to this line of reasoning, equipment and 
training alone simply are not sufficient conditions for a force to be considered special. 
17 Vice Admiral McRaven is a Navy SEAL and the former SOCEUR and NATO Special 
Operations Coordination Center commander who now commands the U.S. Joint Special 
Operations Command. The book referred here was based on the Master’s thesis he had written 
as the student of the Naval Postgraduate School. 
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special operations” and explains that relative superiority of the attacking force is 
achieved when the force, that is “generally smaller, gains a decisive advantage 
over a larger or well-defended enemy.”18 Based on numerous case studies, he 
also identifies the six principles of special operations that lead to relative 
superiority as simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose.19 The 
type of special operation the book misleadingly refers to as special operations 
per se is both an integral part and definitely the most spectacular element of 
special operations: direct action. 
Direct action often makes headlines in the form of raids, assaults, and 
hostage rescues, and it is an inescapable element of special forces “dog and 
pony” shows; it is also a highly demanding task. It is not, however, a unique 
capability of special forces, nor is it a type of military operations that always falls 
into the category of special operations. Nonetheless, due to the very concept of 
relative superiority, direct action attracts considerable attention, maybe because 
there is a natural desire for traditional heroes in the modern era of managers. 
2. Definition of Special Operations 
The most comprehensive definition of special operations is probably the 
one provided by the United States Department of Defense Joint Publications 1-
02 (as of October 31, 2009): 
Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive 
environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or 
economic objectives employing military capabilities for which 
there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations 
often require covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. 
Special operations are applicable across the range of military 
operations. They can be conducted independently or in 
conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other 
government agencies and may include operations through, with, or 
by indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from 
                                            
18 William H. McRaven, Spec Ops-Case studies in special operations warfare: Theory and 
practice (New York: Presidio Press, 1996), 4. 
19 William H. McRaven, Spec Ops-Case studies in special operations warfare: Theory and 
practice (New York: Presidio Press, 1996), 8–23. 
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conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, 
operational techniques, mode of employment, independence 
from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational 
intelligence and indigenous assets [emphases added].20 
This explanation is based on multiple levels of analysis. The definition 
stresses both the physical and political environment of the operations, and uses 
capabilities in lieu of force size. It also addresses the visibility of the operations, 
and extends the scope of such operations across the full spectrum of military 
operations including ground, air and naval operations, or the combinations of 
these. Furthermore, the definition is holistic in terms that it embraces the 
occasional inter-service, inter-agency, and multinational nature of the special 
operations in addition to independent operations. 
 
Figure 1.   Simplified depiction of military operation types 
Special operations, more often than conventional operations, are intended 
to achieve a strategic objective. This means that the objective of the particular 
special operation is of such importance that, if achieved, the objective of the 
operation excessively, or positively disproportionately, contributes to the desired 
end state of the campaign. NATO’s special operations doctrine refers to SOF’s 
“military-strategic and operational level objectives” in a slightly less ambiguous 
way, as “high value objectives.” These are “critical objectives that may entail high 
                                            
20 Defense Technical Information Center, DoD Dictionary of Military Terms, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/s/446.html  (accessed February 16, 2010). 
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risk but also high pay-off value.”21 In business terms, the return on investment is 
disproportionally higher than the accompanying risks. 
3. Special Operations Task Set 
The NATO SOF doctrine identifies four principle tasks, of which three are 
land operations, and several “additional activities” for the Allied Joint Special 
Operations Forces. The three principal land operation tasks and their subtasks 
tasks are:22 
• Special Reconnaissance and Surveillance 
• Environmental Reconnaissance 
• Threat Assessment 
• Target Assessment 
• Post-Strike Reconnaissance 
• Direct Action 
• Raids, Ambushes and Direct Assaults 
• Terminal Guidance Operations 
• Recovery Operations 
• Precision Destruction Operations 
• Opposed Boarding Operations 
• Armed Reconnaissance 
• Military Assistance23 
• Training 
• Advising 
The majority of these tasks are not unique SOF tasks; they can be 
conducted not only by Special Forces and Special Operations Forces, but also 
by conventional forces. Whether these tasks are considered special operations is 
                                            
21 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations AJP-3.5 
(NATO Standardization Agency, 2008), 1–4. 
22 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations AJP-3.5 
(NATO Standardization Agency, 2008), 2-1–2-3). 
23 The elements of the Military Assistance task are explained and compared in a subsequent 
section of the current chapter. 
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contingent on the intent of the operations: do they serve a critical military 
strategic or operational objective that has a high payoff value compared to the 
physical and political risks involved? This also means that in determining what 
contributes toward a special operation the task itself is of limited significance, 
since the vast majority of the above tasks are routinely performed by 
conventional forces.24 Similarly, the type of force that conducts the operation is 
also of restricted importance; any element of the SOF task set can be conducted 
by special forces, but this fact itself does not necessarily make that particular 
military operation a special operation. Force and operation types can also be 
situational and form an exceptional assortment.25 
C. SPECIAL FORCES VS. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES  
In 2008, the Hungarian Ministry of Defense issued a policy paper on the 
Hungarian special operations forces development and employment. The policy 
paper classifies the Hungarian Special Operations Forces as an umbrella 
definition that includes: 
                                            
24 As Spulak notes, “as the capabilities of the conventional forces improve, they may be able 
to perform missions that once were the responsibility of SOF” and concludes that “special 
operations (and SOF) cannot be theoretically be defined in terms of specific and unchanging 
missions, skills or capabilities.” 
 
Robert G. Spulak, Jr., A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities and Use of SOF, 
JSOU Report 07-07, Joint Special Operations University (Hurlburt Field, Florida: The JSOU 
Press, 2007), 4. 
25 In 1943, after the U.S. military had decrypted the Japanese Imperial Navy’s code and 
intercepted a transmission with regard to the flight schedule of a troop visit planned to be 
conducted by Admiral Yamamoto, the mastermind of Pearl Harbor, the president of the U.S. 
ordered Operation Vengeance. The operation was aimed at the neutralization of the commander 
of the Imperial Japanese Navy, Admiral Yamamoto, whose plane was subsequently shot down in 
the operation. Operation Vengeance satisfies every criterion McRaven set forth for “special 
operations,” that is, direct action. The twist is that conventional U.S. Army air assets conducted 
the operation. What was special about the unit involved was that it—since the unit was about to 
finish its lengthy tour—consisted of very capable, trained and combat experienced pilots and 
other service personnel, and the planes were equipped with navigations systems and drop-off 
fuel tanks that were non-standard aviation hardware of the time. This perspective is fully aligned 
with Spulak’s above findings and adds to the notion that SOF and special operations must be 
understood in their dynamic context rather than in rigid categories. 
 
Dr. Daniel L. Haulman, "The Yamamoto Mission," Air Power History, June 2003. 
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• Special Forces that are organized, trained and equipped to conduct 
non-conventional operations and achieve strategic or operational 
objectives by the employment of small units.26 
• Special infantry forces with airborne/air mobile capacities that are 
trained and equipped beyond the average and can both support 
and independently execute certain elements of special operation 
tasks. (Ranger type units.) 
• Special operations capable forces (such as UAV, SIGINT, 
HUMINT, CBRN) that can support special operations and can 
execute certain elements of the special operations task set and, 
thereby, contribute to mission success. 
• Special operations aviation forces.27 
In the HDF the line between the special forces unit and any other unit can 
be clearly drawn from an organizational point of view. The 34th Special Forces 
Battalion is an independent unit, while the other SOF elements are attached to 
different conventional units and are not necessarily widely considered SOF units 
or SOF enablers. 
                                            
26 The term “unconventional warfare” is deliberately avoided in the cited source and in the 
context of HUNSF generally speaking, as NATO does not use the term—most probably due to its 
highly political nature: “Activities conducted to enable resistance movement or insurgency to 
coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an 
underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.” 
 
David M. Witty, "The Great UW Debate," Special Warfare (Department of the Army JFK Special 
Warfare Center and School) 23, no. 2 (March–April 2010): 9–17. 
27 Based on the respective paragraph of the Hungarian Ministry of Defense White Paper on 
Special Operations Forces development and employment. Translation by the author. 
 
Honvédelmi Minisztérium Hadművelti és Kiképzési Főosztály, "A különleges műveletek 
alapfogalmai, a különleges művelti erők szervezete és készenlétének szintjei (1. sz. melléklet a 
1194/2008 nyt. számhoz)," A Magyar Honvédség különleges műveleti képessége 
alkalmazásának és fejlesztésének alapelvei (Principles for the employment and development of 
the HDF's special operations capacity) (Budapest: Magyar Köztársaság Honvédelmi 
Minisztérium, July 28, 2008), 1. 
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Figure 2.   Special Operations Forces in the HDF28 
From a capabilities point of view, the clear divide between Special Forces 
and other SOF is that the former solely exists to perform special operations and 
has the unique capacity to conduct operations that are non-conventional in their 
nature. From a tasks approach, based on the NATO SOF tasks set, the task that 
highlights the slight difference between SF and other SOF best is the advisory 
task under Military Assistance—and there is a connection between this unique 
task and the distinctive unconventional capability. 
D. SPECIAL FORCES AND UNCONVENTIONAL MINDSET 
The Military Assistance task, according to the NATO SOF doctrine, brakes 
down into Training and Advising sub-tasks. The doctrine’s Training description 
emphasizes the improvement of tactical level “individual, leader and 
organizational skills [emphasis added].”29 The Advising narrative is counter-
                                            
28 Figure 2 is a graphic depiction of the Hungarian SOF capacity as described in the 
Hungarian Ministry of Defense’s White Paper on Special Operations Forces development and 
employment. 
 
Honvédelmi Minisztérium Hadművelti és Kiképzési Főosztály, "A különleges műveletek 
alapfogalmai, a különleges művelti erők szervezete és készenlétének szintjei (1. sz. melléklet a 
1194/2008 nyt. számhoz)," A Magyar Honvédség különleges műveleti képessége 
alkalmazásának és fejlesztésének alapelvei (Principles for the employment and development of 
the HDF's special operations capacity) (Budapest: Magyar Köztársaság Honvédelmi 
Minisztérium, July 28, 2008), 1. 
29 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations AJP-3.5 
(NATO Standardization Agency, 2008), 2–3. 
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insurgency focused on the tactical level and underlines the strengthening of 
“population security by providing active participation in tactical operations 
conducted by H[ost] N[ation] military units [emphasis added].”30 These 
explanations, though probably intentionally vague as the results of the member 
nations’ compromise, are somewhat helpful in identifying the divide between 
training ad advising. 
Training is a both prescriptive and descriptive activity, as it is aimed to 
improve skills based on standard (operating) procedures in a reasonably isolated 
environment that is physically separated from the fields where those skills will be 
put to work. Every military unit conducts training and dedicated trainers are 
taught methodologies that increase the efficiency of the training process.  
Advising, on the other hand, is less clear-cut. Compared to training, 
advising takes place where “things happen,” be it combat or other activity, and 
not in an isolated training environment. Based on a non-military definition, 
advising is a developmental process that assists the advisees in the development 
and realization of their goals. Advising is also a decision-making process by 
which the advisees realize their maximum potential through communication and 
information exchanges. The advising process is the responsibility of both the 
advisor and the advisee where the advisor serves as a facilitator of 
communication and coordinator of progress review.31 
                                            
30 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations AJP-3.5 
(NATO Standardization Agency, 2008), 2–3. 
31 “Academic advising is a developmental process which assists students in the clarification 
of their life/career goals and in the development of educational plans for the realization of these 
goals.  It is a decision-making process by which students realize their maximum educational 
potential through communication and information exchanges with an advisor; it is ongoing, 
multifaceted, and the responsibility of both student and advisor.  The advisor serves as a 
facilitator of communication, a coordinator of learning experiences through course and career 
planning and academic progress review, and an agent of referral to other campus agencies as 
necessary.” 
 
Tuskegee University, Academic Advising Definition, 
http://www.tuskegee.edu/Global/story.asp?S=6925874 (accessed February 25, 2010). 
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There is much more to advising than what can be described within the 
limits of this thesis and, in practice, training and advising are likely to have some 
overlap. One of the fundamental differences between training and advising is that 
the former intends to perfect the application of processes, while the latter’s goal 
is to assist and bring about the maximum potential of the advisees to make 
adequate and appropriate judgments that are based on the advisees’ personality 
and experience. Training and advising, then, differ in their goals and the methods 
by which those goals are achieved. Training is more straightforward and advising 
is somewhat indirect. Moreover, advisers, unlike trainers, cannot be mass 
produced, partly due to the traits required to be successful in the application of 
training and advising. 
Some of the traits required for military advisory are maturity (not in terms 
of age), empathy (but not sympathy), patience, humbleness (but not 
submissiveness), ability to intuitively read situations, cultures and people, and 
comprehend how those people read the advisor, and ability to take an indirect 
approach. These attributes are by no means exclusive; nevertheless, they 
suggest that there are some unorthodox requirements for Special Forces to be 
able to conduct non-conventional operations as described in the Hungarian 
MoD’s White Paper. 
Whereas the capability to conduct non-conventional operations is 
adequately addressed by Porkoláb and Bári, the often-heard need for an 
unconventional mindset or thinking is less explored.32 The preface of an earlier 
Hungarian Land Forces tactics manual, issued in the mid-1990s, pointed out that 
the procedures discussed in the manual were to be employed in a creative way. 
This was quite a departure from the previous order-oriented approach, where the 
what and the how used to be equally prescribed—leaving virtually no room for 
consideration or judgment to the commanders. The manual, however, failed to 
                                            
32 Imre Porkoláb and Gábor Bári, Enhancing national security in Hungary through the 
development and employment of Special Forces, MSc Thesis, Defense Analysis Department, 
Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 13–22, 51, 
116. 
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make any reference to the so-called Auftragstaktik that stresses the importance 
of the commander’s intent (what) and leaves considerable room for maneuver to 
the subordinate commander in terms of how he is going to achieve that intent. 
Although this principle is much desired in the HDF,33 34 mission command is not 
actually represented as an overarching leadership principle.35 
The Auftragstaktik principle is undoubtedly present in HUNSF, though 
there is more to the required unconventional mindset. Unconventional thinking 
also means not taking anything by face value and seeking out the intention of the 
rules rather than blindly apply them, and occasionally even questioning authority. 
Thinking unconventionally means seeing around the corner where other people 
see walls and being innovative and adaptive as the rule and not the exception, 
while remaining moral or, at worst, amoral, but never immoral.36  
Spulak emphasizes seemingly other traits for SOF, and intentionally 
avoids using the term unconventional. He states that “the distributions of 
attributes for SOF personnel are different for the military […] because there is a 
minimum standard against which these personnel were selected.” He adds that it 
is not the physical but the “mental and psychological attributes” that “create three 
fundamental qualities of SOF.”37 These Spulak summarized as “SOF are elite 
                                            
33  László Lakatos, "A Magyar Honvédség markáns változásai és jövője (The remarkable 
changes and the future of the HDF)," Új Honvédségi Szemle (HM Zrínyi Kommunikációs 
Szolgáltató Kht. Médiaigazgatósága) LXI, no. 2007/5 (2007). 
34  Lieutenant General Tibor Benkő, Magyar Honvédség Összahaderőnemi Parancsnokság 
(Hungarian Defense Forces Joint Force Command), 
https://www.parbeszed.hm.gov.hu/portal/server.pt?open=512&objID=246&parentname=Communi
tyPage&parentid=3&mode=2&in_hi_userid=339145&cached=true (accessed March 9, 2010). 
35 Péter Lippai, Chances and Limits of Mission Command, PhD Dissertation, Hadtudományi 
Iskola, Miklós Zrínyi National Defense University (Budapest: Miklós Zrínyi National Defense 
University, 2009), 11–13. 
36 This last condition is of worth. Without morality added, one could argue that “tax 
optimization,” a “national sport” in many countries, is an excellent example of unconventional 
thinking if no rules are broken. These notions of conventional vs. unconventional thinking were 
strongly influenced by Professor Anna Simons’ Military Advisor class at the Naval Postgraduate 
School in AY2010/1, though the opinions and ideas expressed here are solely the author’s 
responsibility. 
37 Robert G. Spulak, Jr., A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities and Use of 
SOF, JSOU Report 07-07, Joint Special Operations University (Hurlburt Field, Florida: The JSOU 
Press, 2007), 39. 
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warriors, creative and flexible,” who directly implement the strategy in war, are 
able to adapt to the changing situations of their environment, and “have a much 
larger range of capabilities and are more independent of the other military forces 
than conventional units.”38 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the personal and organizational traits, organizational task 
sets, the objectives and their desired effects have been described to characterize 
special operations, SOF and Special Forces. Acknowledging that more 
distinctions can be made depending on the level of analysis, these discussed 
features are considered the most significant, since they also address the most 
popular misunderstandings regarding special operations, Special Forces, SOF 
and their utility. 
On the individual level, the main difference between special and other 
forces is the unconventional mindset required for every single SF service 
member. This does not mean that people with an unconventional mindset can 
only be found in special forces and conventional soldiers are “in-the-box-
thinkers,” or there is a difference in quality or usefulness between the two forces. 
It means that Special Forces operators, as a rule, need to have an unorthodox 
mindset to be successful in their tasks, whereas unconventionality is not a 
prerequisite for conducting successful conventional operations.  
From an organizational task set and their desired effects point of view, 
there is a certain overlap between special operations and conventional tasks. 
What stands out as a truly unique special forces task is the advisory role whose 
prerequisite is unconventionality or, as Spulak states, unique distribution of 
“mental and psychological attributes.” The other SOF tasks amount to special 
operations only if they serve a critical military strategic or operational objective 
that has a high payoff value compared to the physical and political risks involved, 
                                            
38 Robert G. Spulak, Jr., A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities and Use of 
SOF, JSOU Report 07-07, Joint Special Operations University (Hurlburt Field, Florida: The JSOU 
Press, 2007), 39. 
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and there is no readily available conventional asset to achieve that objective. 
What follows is that, in theory, conventional forces can conduct certain SOF 
tasks and SOF can equally be employed to achieve non-SOF objectives. The 
one and only field where there is a definite distinction between SF and 
conventional forces is the former’s unique personal and organizational attributes. 
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III. SPECIAL FORCES EVOLUTION: HISTORICAL AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
A. COMMON TRAITS IN THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN SPECIAL 
FORCES 
In Commandos and Politicians, Eliot A. Cohen—through the study of 
British, Israeli, French and U.S. elite military units’ as well as Otto Skorzeny’s 
Friedenthalers’ historic background, origins and actions since World War II— 
examines the circumstances of the birth, evolution and utility of elite units. Cohen 
also carefully analyses the various costs associated with the existence and 
actions of what he labels as elite units.39 
Cohen dedicates special attention to “[t]he most interesting political 
aspects of elite units” that “appear at their birth and in their early struggles with 
bureaucratic predators.”40 According to Cohen’s argument, the emergence of a 
perceived national security threat that was manifested in a military need—to 
conduct commando type operations and unconventional warfare—and the 
presence of skilled and dedicated military leaders along with their respective 
influential sponsor’s “romantic image of war” led to the establishment of the elite 
units.41 The author, clearly not in particular favor of such units, sees his 
assessment justified by the fact that a decline in either the threat level or the 
sponsors’ support, or both, historically resulted in the disbandment of elite units. 
                                            
39 Eliot A. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians-Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies 
(Cambidge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978). 
40 Eliot A. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians-Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies 
(Cambidge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978), 27. 
41 Eliot A. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians-Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies 
(Cambidge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978), 35. 
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Such was the case with the British SAS, the Israeli Palmach, the Underwater 
Demolition Teams and the Office of Strategic Services.42 
The formation of the officially non-existent 1st Special Forces 
Detachment—Delta (1st SFD-D) is another example of both the challenges and 
the stages of special forces evolution. The establishment of 1st SFD-D, as 
described by its founder Charlie Beckwith, required the successful examples of 
units with similar mission, like the British SAS and the German GSG9, and 
tremendous amount of dedication from those who thought such capacity was 
necessary in the U.S. military. More importantly, the second stage of Delta’s 
evolution, following its birth, needed a well thought-out strategy to recruit allies 
within the military and the political sphere. These allies could then convince other 
influential supporters and decision makers in order to overcome the 
bureaucracy’s resistance and the refusal of those who felt their interests and 
authority threatened by the new unit. Moreover, “divine intervention,” in the form 
of the Mogadishu hijacking incident in 1977, changed the perceptions with regard 
to the security environment and added the President to the group of supporters 
as the most influential sponsor.43 
The history of the U.S. Army Special Forces (USASF) is also 
characterized by ups and downs. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was 
established during the second World War by William “Wild Bill” Donovan’s 
dedication and the support Franklin D. Roosevelt, a friend and former classmate, 
could provide. After the war, the OSS, along with other special operations forces, 
                                            
42 Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare-Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 10. 
 
Another example is the U.S.-Canadian 1st Special Service Force (1st SSF). Created during 
World War II and intended primarily for winter warfare in Europe, it did not even live long enough 
to experience the challenges other special units faced in their early years. The 1st SSF was 
mostly employed as elite infantry before it was disbanded well before the end of the war due to 
the extremely heavy losses it sustained during operations in Italy and France. 
 
Wikipedia The Free Encyclopedia, Devil's Brigade, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Devil%27s_Brigade (accessed March 3, 2010). 
43 Charlie A. Beckwith and Donald Knox, Delta Force (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 
1985). 
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was nearly eliminated. The reappearance in the form of U.S. Army Special 
Forces was triggered by “John F. Kennedy’s call” in the 1950s amid the 
deteriorating political and military situation in Southeast Asia. 44 Though Kennedy 
took special interest in the U.S. Special Forces, the force was largely discredited 
in the Vietnam War and “there was an approximately 70 percent reduction in the 
manning of the special operations forces and a 95 percent reduction in 
funding.”45 
The birth of USASF was, then, characterized by a recent historic example, 
the expertise of mainly ex-OSS personnel, the explicit support of a very influential 
sponsor, and an emerging security threat. Although the U.S. Special Operations 
Forces regained significance in the 1980s, it was not until a series of failures in 
operations when U.S. SOF finally entered the second stage of its evolution and 
secured a permanent seat at the table of the “older siblings.” This occurred via a 
legislative change that concerned the bureaucratic embededdness of U.S. SOF. 
The legislative reform of the highest-level military structure was initiated 
from within, as most military decision makers were aware of the issues 
discovered by the Brehm Report,46 but service and individual career interest as 
well as the seemingly impossible task and the natural resistance of 
bureaucracies toward change discouraged the idea.47 
                                            
44 Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare-Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 4. 
45 Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare-Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 58. 
46 “In 1981, General Jones asked William Brehm, a former Pentagon official, to lead a study 
evaluating the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Jones had become frustrated with the 
Joint Chiefs’ ineffectiveness. Requiring unanimity among the group’s five members to reach a 
decision, the Joint Chiefs tended to resort to embracing the least common denominator just to get 
some sort of agreement. Brehm’s report came back eleven months later, recommending 
substantial, and likely painful, reform to the Joint Chiefs system.”  
 
"Special Inspector General Iraq Reconstruction," Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986, www.sigir.mil/applyinghardlessons/pdf/Goldwater-Nichols.pdf 
(accessed March 12, 2010). 
47 James R. Locher, Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the 
Pentagon (A & M University Press, 2002). 
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The environment in which General Jones, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, initiated the legislative and organizational changes was 
historically the most permissive. The recent military fiascos or near fiascos 
(Operation Eagle Claw in Iran, the SS Mayaguez incident in Cambodia, USS 
Pueblo incident near North Korea and Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada) and 
the public’s awareness of those created a “something needs to be done” 
atmosphere within the highest levels of U.S. government. However, the fact that 
General Jones was nearing the end of his term and if he had gotten fired would 
have done little harm to his career also might have played a role in his boldness 
to carry out the plan. 
General Jones’s attempt to initiate the changes from within, and the fact 
that he hired prominent retired general officers to conduct the primary research 
that was manifested in the Brehm Report, also proved to be a wise decision. 
When the “from within” attempt failed, due to the excellent design used to 
conduct the research, the most influential decision makers’ attitudes had already 
been mapped. Moreover, the Brehm Report also served as the basis of the 
subsequent Goldwater-Nichols Act that introduced “institutional sponsorship” for 
U.S. SOF, and mitigated the problems arising from individual sponsorship.48 
Today, in the third stage of its evolution, U.S. SOF faces different kinds of 
challenges that can also have some relevance for HUNSF. Marquis warns of the 
threat that arises from SOF becoming a too service-like entity and, thereby, 
loosing much of the traits that make it capable of conducting special 
operations.49 Her concerns are primarily organizational in nature, since a military 
service is typically a divisionally structured bureaucracy,50 or what Wilson 
                                            
48 Thomas K.Adams, US Special Operations in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional 
Warfare (New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 298. 
49 Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare-Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 258–261. 
50 Henry Mintzberg, “Organization design: Fashion or Fit?” Harvard Business Review 
(Harvard Business Publishing), January–February 1981, 8–9. 
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considers a procedural organization.51 SOF, alternatively and partly due to its 
comparatively smaller size and task set, is more of a combination of a missionary 
organization and an operating adhocracy,52 or what Wilson refers to as a craft 
and coping organization.53 
In another view of SOF’s future, Adams suggests an Unconventional 
Operations Force (UOF) that would leave the more conventional tasks, such as 
direct actions and special reconnaissance, to the Navy SEALs, the Rangers and 
the conventional forces. The UOF would retain the missions or tasks that are not 
only special “because they are done at a very high level of proficiency and often 
in very difficult circumstances,” but are truly unique due to the fact that they are 
“not part of the conventional warfighting.” The proposed UOF would consist of 
the Special Forces, Civic Actions and Psychological Operations components of 
SOF. 54 
Similarly, in their very recent NPS thesis, a group of U.S. authors calls for 
an Irregular Warfare Command that “will enable the Department of Defense 
(DoD) to organize efficiently and effectively for operations within the Irregular 
Warfare Environment, while maintaining its conventional capabilities.”55 
Accordingly, “the DoD should establish a separate organization, incorporating 
existing capabilities, focused on conducting operations within” the Irregular 
Warfare environment.56 The proposed IW Command would encompass the 
                                            
51 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it, New 
Edition, 2000 (Basic Books, Inc., 1989), 163–164. 
52 Henry Mintzberg, “Organization design: Fashion or Fit?” Harvard Business Review 
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54 Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operations in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional 
Warfare (New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 304. 
55 David J. Painter, Mark C. Weaver and Scott C. White, Reorganizing for Irregular Warfare, 
MSc Thesis , Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey: Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2009), 99, v. 
56 David J. Painter, Mark C. Weaver and Scott C. White, Reorganizing for Irregular Warfare, 
MSc Thesis , Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey: Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2009), 67. 
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forces and capabilities Adam described in his scheme with the addition of the 
Marine Special Operations Advisory Group.57 
The above are clear signs of the third phase of SOF evolution, when the 
goal of SOF’s struggle shifts from sheer survival and growth to the preservation 
of distinct organizational values, the identity of Special Forces, and the 
redefinition of tasks. The major concern in the second stage of SOF evolution is 
exactly the advancement of those distinct organizational values. As trivial as it 
may well sound, the prerequisite for discrete organizational values is the 
existence of a fully functioning, distinctive organization—an open system, with 
sub-systems on the tactical, operational and strategic level. One of the 
challenges HUNSF faces in its second stage of evolution is precisely the 
establishment of this fully functional and distinctive organization that is also 
reasonably integrated into the bigger HDF realm. 
B. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES 
1. Two Sets of Missions 
The organizational distinctiveness between SOF and other forces is 
noticeable not only in those forces’ tactical organizations, but also in their 
management structures, or, in military terms, their command and control 
arrangements. Yet, the dissimilarities are not the consequences of the 
“conventional” or “special” labels, but the inherent characteristics of these forces’ 
management structures: their missions, goals, tasks and the environment in 
which the organization exists. 
In Notes on Low-intensity Warfare, Luttwak differentiates between attrition 
based and relational-maneuver based warfare, and asserts that “the closer they 
are to the theoretical extreme of pure attrition, the more armed forces tend to be 
focused on their own internal administration and operations, being 
                                            
57 David J. Painter, Mark C. Weaver and Scott C. White, Reorganizing for Irregular Warfare, 
MSc Thesis , Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey: Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2009), 68. 
 31
correspondingly less responsive to the external environment […]” in order to “to 
maximize process efficiencies” of the attrition that enables victory on the 
battlefield. The mission and goals of the conventional forces determine the 
structural arrangements, because 
a well-managed armed force of this kind cannot logically be 
adaptive to the external environment; instead it should strive to 
develop an optimal set of organizational formats, methods, and 
tactics which are then to be applied whenever possible with the 
least modification, because any modification must be suboptimal.58 
On the other hand, Luttwak notes that the relational-maneuver oriented 
warfare needs to be more conscious and appreciative of its environment, since 
for such warfare “victory is to be obtained by identifying the specific weaknesses 
of the particular enemy and then reconfiguring one's own capabilities to exploit 
those weaknesses.” This requires thorough understanding of and flexible 
adaptation to the operating environment. Since adaptation necessitates 
institutionalized and frequent changes, 
armed forces with a high relational-maneuver content cannot 
usually maximize process efficiencies and cannot logically develop 
optimal organizational formats, methods, and tactics. Instead each 
must be relational, i.e. reconfigured ad hoc […].59 
Whereas Luttwak makes the very legitimate point that “there is, of course, 
no inherent virtue to either attrition or relational maneuver”60 and one cannot 
possibly maintain that conventional forces are on the one end of the spectrum 
with special forces on the other, differing missions and goals require distinct 
organizational structures. 
                                            
58 Edward N. Luttwak, "Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare," Parameters (U.S. Army War 
College) XIII., no. 4 (December 1983): 11–18, 13. 
59 Edward N. Luttwak, "Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare," Parameters (U.S. Army War 
College) XIII., no. 4 (December 1983): 11–18, 13. 
60 Edward N. Luttwak, "Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare," Parameters (U.S. Army War 
College) XIII., no. 4 (December 1983): 11–18, 13. 
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2. Characteristics of Organizations 
Bureaucracies, to include military organizations, are rich sources of 
frustration. This has many roots, as organizations are designed to perform 
certain tasks in a particular environment. Effective organizations perform their 
core tasks well and others not so well: they come with limitations by design 
depending on their type. 
Perhaps the most common typology of organizations is the one compiled 
by Mintzberg. According to this theory, organizations can be categorized as 
simple configuration/structure, machine bureaucracy, adhocracy/innovative 
organization, professional bureaucracy, divisionalized form and 
idealistic/missionary organizations.61 These structures are not necessarily 
represented in a clear-cut way. They can create hybrids; especially, since 
organizations have a life cycle and the stages thereof may require different 
structures. 
The elements that build up these structures are common with the 
emphasis shifting, depending on the particular organization. These elements are 
depicted in Figure 3. The strategic apex is the top management or the 
executives, the operating core performs the basic work/production within the 
organization, the managers are the middle line between the strategic apex and 
the operating core, and there are two additional support elements. The 
technostructure is to “design systems concerned with the formal planning and 
control of the work,” while the support staff provides “indirect services to the rest 
of the organization—everything from the cafeteria and the mail room to the public 
relations department and legal counsel.“62  
                                            
61 Henry Mintzberg, “Organization design: Fashion or Fit?” Harvard Business Review 
(Harvard Business Publishing), January–February 1981, 4–5. 
62 Henry Mintzberg, “Organization design: Fashion or Fit?” Harvard Business Review 
(Harvard Business Publishing), January–February 1981, 3. 
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Figure 3.   Mintzberg’s five basic parts of organizations63 
As both Luttwak and Mintzberg asserts, an organization is successful in 
achieving its stated purpose if it fits in to its environment. The level of uncertainty 
in the task environment determines the type of organization that is the best fit 
given the particular environment and task set. Environmental uncertainty derives 
from to factors: stability and complexity. The more rapidly changes occur in the 
task environment, the less stable it becomes. Similarly, the number and variety of 
external elements relevant to the problems the organization faces determines the 
complexity of the task environment. A few and independent issues result in a 
simple environment, whereas many and interconnected problems create 
complexity.64 
                                            
63 Figure 3 is based on Mintzberg’s description of the five basic parts. The figure here is a 
schematic depiction of a machine bureaucracy. 
Henry Mintzberg, “Organization design: Fashion or Fit?” Harvard Business Review (Harvard 
Business Publishing), January-February 1981, 3. 
64 Erik Jansen, "MN3121 Organizations Design for Special Operations," Mintzberg's 
"Structures in Fives" (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School). 
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Figure 4.   Four of Mintzberg’s structures and their major characteristics and 
respective environments (after Erik Jansen)65 
The major structures described herein and depicted in Figure 4 often 
overlap, and a certain structure can occasionally host another within its 
organization. Since the structures are meant to serve dissimilar goals, such 
symbiosis is inevitably a rich source of conflicts. Such is the relationship between 
the bureaucratic structures of the HDF and HUNSF. 
                                            
65 Excerpt from:  Erik Jansen, "MN3121 Organizations Design for Special Operations," 
Mintzberg's "Structures in Fives" (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, AY2009/3). 
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3. Differences by Design 
As Wilson asserts, “culture is to an organization what personality is to an 
individual;” it is “a persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of 
and human relationships within an organization.”66 The more clearly and 
precisely the “central tasks,” the mission, of an organization are defined, the 
more clear-cut the culture. “If all or most members agree as to what the 
organization’s central tasks are and how they should be performed, then the 
organization has a single culture.”67 Since the HDF is a bureaucracy with a 
variety of tasks to perform, a single culture is difficult to develop and maintain. 
This is, however, not the case with HUNSF. 
HUNSF began as a missionary organization that was built around a single 
ethos: the creation of the special forces capacity in the HDF. Today, in terms of 
the bureaucratic life cycle depicted in Table 2, HUNSF is between the second 
(collectivity) and third stage (formalization), while the HDF, as a long-standing 
organization with a variety of tasks, is in the fourth cycle of its life (elaboration). 
Even though such categorization has no merit in itself, the traits that accompany 
the stages, due to conflicting preferences, help determine the relationship 
between HUNSF and the HDF. 
Missionary organizations share many of their characteristics with (social or 
political) movements. A charismatic leader with an ideology recruits a like-minded 
group in pursuit of a single agenda. The hardcore is a “band of brothers” with a 
very strong commitment toward the cause. The organization must grow; 
therefore, they recruit, or rather select, the personnel of the organization.  The 
organization creates its symbols, myths, traditions and rituals. Further 
admissions are usually subject to strict standards established by the hardcore. 
There is no—or only ad-hoc—functional differentiation of tasks; the span of 
                                            
66 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it, New 
Edition, 2000 (Basic Books, Inc., 1989). 91. 
67 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it, New 
Edition, 2000 (Basic Books, Inc., 1989), 93. 
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control is wide with the decisions made by the charismatic leader. There is 
virtually no formalization, and specialization is not particularly diverse; members 
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Table 2.   The life cycle of organizations (after Erik Jensen)68 
Since the movement needs to grow and the bureaucracy manages the 
resources required for growth, HUNSF produced its own managers. With the 
relatively recent establishment of HUNSF’s formal representation in the HDF’s 
bureaucracy, HUNSF entered the pre-bureaucratic stage of its life cycle with 
adhocracy-like organizational characteristics. Continuing training and much 
education still play an important role. The jobs are increasingly specialized 
horizontally, and the organization is losing some of its movement-like 
characteristics, but it remains organic and innovative nonetheless. Charismatic 
leadership is still of significance; however, with decentralization occurring by the 
movement becoming institutionalized, charisma is amended with management 
skills that are vital in the bureaucratic structure. 
                                            
68 Erik Jansen, "MN3121 Organizational Design for Special Operations," Life Cycle, Size & 
Bureaucracy (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, AY2009/3). 
 
The stages of SOF evolution that were established and used in the previous section on the 
evolution of modern special forces, while similar to the ones described in the current table, are 
not identical, as the former applies solely to special forces. 
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Mutual adjustment, as the main characteristic of an adhocracy, does not 
require much formalization, but does need a short chain of command that fits the 
rather unstable and complex operating environment—be it the domestic 
“bureaucratic jungle” or the deployed HUNSF elements’ combat theatre. 
Moreover, adhocracies are not meant to produce outputs; there is no “product” at 
the end of the work process. Since formalization is very low to non-existent, 
adhocracies are outcome/effect focused in lieu of process.69 
As for the HDF’s bureaucracy, of Mintzberg’s structures it is closest to the 
divisionalized structure with strong machine bureaucracy-like characteristics. 
Unlike in adhocracies, jobs are both horizontally and vertically specialized and 
standardized procedures are the norm. The divisions, like JFC’s branches, are 
“tall” with the decision makers considerably distanced from the non-managers. 
The authority and power are centered at the top of each division/branch, which 
also means that non-managers are not empowered. Hence, divisions/branches 
are only seemingly the indicators of delegated authority in terms of decision 
making, as “managers at the heads of these units retain the lion's share of the 
power” and the structure is even “more centralized than many functional 
structures where large numbers of specialists get involved in the making of 
important decisions.”70 This notion of less, or more direct and timely, access to 
decision makers in the absence of delegated power, does make a difference in a 
dynamic, rapidly and unpredictably changing task environment. 
                                            
69 The JFC’s Special Operations Section provides ample examples to underline these 
observations. The Section was established before the HDF even had a Special Operations 
Policy. Formalization was virtually nonexistent prior to the foundation of the Section, and 
regulations with regard to HUNSF are still embryonic. Daily and longer-term issues are largely 
dealt with in an ad hoc manner rather than along established lines of standards. The Section 
Chief, with the consent of the Chief J3, has an access to the JFC Commander comparable to 
those of the “J-Heads.” Moreover, the tasks of the Section are mostly self-defined or directly 
come from the JFC Commander rather than assigned by the Chief J3, and their execution is 
widely coordinated through horizontal “shortcuts” to other JFC branches or MoD departments. 
70 Henry Mintzberg, "Organization design: Fashion or Fit?" Harvard Business Review 
(Harvard Business Publishing), January-February 1981, 9. 
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Figure 5.   Mintzberg’s divisionalized form and its characteristics (after Erik 
Jansen)71 
As noted above, the divisionalized structure’s divisions are machine 
bureaucracies. Those work best in a reasonably stable and predictable task 
environment. The divisionalized structure was created for the very purpose of 
increasing the structure’s flexibility and adaptability to the environment.72 
Nevertheless, “some evidence suggests that the control systems of these 
structures discourages risk taking and innovation”73 that are inherent to 
adhocracies.74 
                                            
71 Excerpt from: Erik Jansen, "MN3121 Organizations Design for Special Operations," 
Mintzberg's "Structures in Fives" (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, AY2009/3). 
72 Henry Mintzberg, "Organization design: Fashion or Fit?" Harvard Business Review 
(Harvard Business Publishing), January-February 1981, 9. 
73 Henry Mintzberg, "Organization design: Fashion or Fit?" Harvard Business Review 
(Harvard Business Publishing), January-February 1981, 9–10. 
74 Based on Hannah’s observations, the frustrations the characteristics of a machine 
bureaucracy can create include: the blind application of process regardless of the circumstances 
(“This is what the book says!”); using the standardized procedures as an excuse for not making 
the effort (“I don’t make the rules”); highly specialized jobs without duplication (“That’s not my job 
but Joe’s, but he’s not in today.”); no personal incentives to perform beyond the minimum (“Will 
they pay me more if I fill in for Joe today?”); centralized decisions (“I’ll have to ask my boss [but 
he’s out of the office right now.]); standardization of performance and rigidity (“This is how we 
always did this, why change what worked for years?). 
 
David P. Hannah, “Understanding How Organizations Function,” in Designing Organizations for 
High Performance, 1-31 (Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1988), 5–7. 
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C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In summation, the first stage of special forces evolution is characterized by 
a previously unmatched threat in the security environment, the perceived or 
actual lack of military capacity to adequately address that threat, a committed 
and able individual with a vision of how to best cope with the threat, prominent 
sponsors, and other nations’ example in terms of the required force. 
The second phase of the evolution requires what Adams calls the 
institutional sponsorship for the new force to become reasonably established with 
no imminent and recurring threat to its existence.75 This seems to require a 
legislative action that sets the basis for bureaucratic establishment. Such action 
can be implemented in a unique, politically permissive environment and 
facilitated by “bureaucratic guerrillas:” experienced, incentivized lobbyists and 
managers with the appropriate leverage, connections and expertise.76 HUNSF is 
considered to be at the beginning of this second phase. 
The third stage seems to occur when the conventional military, due to 
improvements in technology and policy, increasingly incorporates and begins to 
routinely execute tasks that were once special. This, along with other factors like 
a new challenge in the security environment, forces SOF to redefine itself, its 
task set and the adjoining organizational structure. 
Dissimilar missions and operating environments require bureaucratic 
structures designed to effectively deal with the challenges that particular 
missions and environments present. Organizations are not meant to perform well 
beyond their realm of mission and environment. Their flexibility, the ability to 
adapt, is limited by design. 
                                            
75  Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operations in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional 
Warfare (New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 298. 
76 Although the term seems to be widely used in the context of bureaucracies, among the 
relevant SOF literature it is Marquis who uses it as “the bureaucratic guerrillas who fought for 
SOF reform.” 
 
Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare-Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 266. 
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Most military organizations are divisionalized structures. Their branches or 
departments are machine bureaucracies or, at best, professional ones. HUNSF’s 
present organizational structure is in the pre-bureaucratic stage of its life cycle, 
and that bureaucratic structure is closest to an adhocracy. An adhocracy is, by 
definition, innovative. The flipside of the argument is that, by design, innovation is 
about the only thing an adhocracy does well. Placing HUNSF’s adhocracy that is 
in the pre-bureaucratic stage of its life in the fully developed bureaucratic 
structure of the HDF inevitably creates frictions due to conflicting organizational 
preferences. An adhocracy wants effects through innovation and adaptation, 
while a mature bureaucracy will struggle to apply the processes that have been 
developed and applied throughout the years for and by other elements of the 
organization. Since the evolution of HUNSF creates a complex sub-environment 
within the reasonably stable and simple surroundings of the HDF, the solution to 
the resulting organizational friction may be a unique organizational arrangement. 
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IV. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: THE ANALYSIS OF THE 
ENVIRONMENT 
A. RESEARCH BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
1. Purpose, Data Collection Methods and Means 
The research data was gathered by using a survey questionnaire that was 
developed based on the investigator’s personal experiences during his service in 
the JFC and his interactions with SOF and non-SOF personnel.77 The vast 
majority of the actual data collection occurred in interview settings, while a 
smaller number of the subjects were engaged via email and completed the 
questionnaire on their own. All twenty-one subjects are senior HDF military staff 
personnel with at least ten years of active duty service. Eighty percent of the 
subjects had been serving between one and three years on their position at the 
time the data was collected, and none of them had served less than one year on 
their recent job. 
The subjects were dispersed across the command structures’ functional 
areas with substantial relevance to HUNSF. Functional areas such as aviation 
safety and aviation engineering were left out of the data collection due to their 
very limited interaction with HUNSF related issues. The sample also includes 
HUNSF personnel in staff functions with or without actual SOF or SF 
background. 
Despite the relatively small sample, the survey is still considered to 
represent the intended audience, since the primary objective of the research is to 
analyze the bureaucratic environment of HUNSF in order to determine the 
environment’s permissiveness for HUNSF’s upkeep and future development as 
the main dependent variable. Accordingly, the following survey questions were 
designed to capture the subjects’: 
                                            
77 The actual survey questionnaire is available in Appendix A. 
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• exposure to HUNSF/SOF and special operations (Questions 3, 5–
7); 
• perceptions about HUNSF and special operations (Questions 8,19); 
• relative attitude toward HUNSF and special operations (Questions 
24-27); 
• military organizational values (Questions 12–16); 
• perceptions about HUNSF’s attitudes (Questions 17–19, 23); 
• level of understanding regarding HUNSF and special operations 
(Questions 9–11). 
The survey questionnaire included close ended, multiple choice and 
scaled, as well as matrix questions. On occasion, “yes or no” type questions 
were combined with contingency questions. For the scaled questions, 1 through 
7 scales were used with, save for two questions, no option offered for the mean 
(4) answer. The absolute negative (“don’t agree”) and positive (“completely 
agree”) options are represented by 1 and 7 respectively for the most part; 
deviances from this will be indicated in the course of the discussion. 
2. Overall Model and the Independent and Dependent Variables 
Based on the above grouping of the survey questions, five independent 
(IV) and four proxy dependent variables (DV) were generated.78 The subjects’ 
exposure to HUNSF/SOF and special operations was further partitioned, 
because the different exposure types were assumed to cause distinct variance in 
the dependent variable through the proxy dependent variables. Therefore, 
operational exposure to HUNSF, SOF and/or special operations became the first 
independent variable based on whether the subject had been deployed to active 
operational theaters and if he, during the tour, had interacted with national or 
other special (operations) forces (Question 3). 
 
 
                                            
78 For the overall model and the proposed causal mechanism, see Table 1 in the Hypotheses 
section of Chapter I. 
 43
The subjects’ educational exposure to SOF and special operations is the 
second independent variable. The relevant survey questions (Questions 5 & 6) 
were combined, since one of them inquired the extent (relative significance in the 
subjects’ military education) and the other the nature (graduate, seminar, course) 
of the subjects’ exposure to SOF education.79  
The third independent variable represents the extent of the subjects’ 
organizational experience with HUNSF. This variable is based on the survey’s 
seventh question that asks, on a 1 through 7 scale, about the frequency with 
which the subject or the branch he belongs to interacts with HUNSF related 
issues. 
The fourth independent variable, military value alignment, is the most 
interesting with the expectation of significant variance on the dependent variable. 
This variable is created as the combination of the individual responses to 
questions 12 and 15. Both questions contain the same list of 39 organizational 
values or characteristics. The subjects were required to select ten of those in 
both questions. In Question 12, the subjects were to choose the values that they 
individually considered the most important and ideal for the military. In Question 
15, they were asked to select the ones that they thought most characterized 
HUNSF. The goal of combining these questions was to determine the degree of 
congruency in terms of the subjects’ actual military values and of those they 
associated with HUNSF.80 
The fifth independent variable is HUNSF’s attitude towards the 
conventional military as perceived by the subjects. This variable is of special 
importance, since it brings HUNSF directly into the equation assuming that the 
way HUNSF is perceived to treat their conventional brothers also influences the 
environment in which HUNSF exists. The relevant question to this variable is 
                                            
79 IV2 is the combination of the pertinent individual responses from questions number five 
and six (IV2[=R5*[R6+1] where R stands for the individual responses). 
80 When the individual’s two value sets are fully aligned, the sum result of the combined 
questions number 12 and 15 is 10, whereas nil agreement is represented by 0: 
IV4=Σ(R12/1*R15/1)+(R12/2*15/2)+[…] (R12/39*15/39). 
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number eighteen where the subjects were to assess, on a 1 through 7 scale, 
whether they thought HUNSF disregarded the conventional military. On this 
scale, more means actually less in terms of the dependent variable’s value (the 
more HUNSF is believed to disregard the conventional military, the less 
permissive the bureaucratic environment). 
As for the other set of variables, four proxy dependent variables have 
been generated to assist the main dependent variable. The first such variable is 
the relative attitude of the subjects toward HUNSF. This was created based on 
the elements of the eighth question in the survey where the subjects were given 
statements and they had to determine, on a scale from 1 through 7, the extent to 
which they considered those statements applicable to HUNSF. Since there is no 
objective answer to those sub-questions, they indicate the subjects’ attitude 
toward HUNSF on the given area.81 
The second proxy dependent variable concerns the perceived “HUNSF 
ego.” The assumption is that the more HUNSF is considered “high and mighty” 
by the relevant non-HUNSF personnel, the less cooperative the latter becomes. 
This variable was generated based on the responses to Question 17 in the 
survey. 
The third proxy dependent variable concerns HUNSF’s alleged 
relationship to regulations. The relevant survey question (Question 19) inquires 
about the subjects’ perception on whether HUNSF follows the rules and 
regulations more or less often than other HDF elements—or is there no 
difference? The responses were scaled from 1 to 7 with the highest being the 
most favorable for HUNSF and also contributing to a decrease in the dependent 
variable’s value. 
                                            
81 The subject’s relative attitude was determined by dividing the sum of the responses by 
individuals to the positive (e.g., high level of training) and the negative (e.g., despise of non-
HUNSF personnel) sub-questions (DV1=Σ [R8/a,c,f,g+1] / [ Σ R8/d,e,h+1]). 
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Name of the variable Respective survey question 
Independent  
1. Operational exposure 3 
2. Educational exposure 5,6 
3. Organizational exposure 7 
4. Military value alignment 12,15 
5. HUNSF’s attitude to the military 18 
Dependent  
1. Relative attitude to SF 8/a,c,d,f,g,i 
2. Perceived HUNSF ego 17 
3. HUNSF’s attitude to regulations 19 
4. HUNSF’s perceived utility 24-27 
Table 3.   List of dependent and independent variables 
The last alternative dependent variable is of HUNSF’s perceived utility by 
the subjects. This is thought to cause significant variance on the main dependent 
variable, and is created by merging the responses of four related opinion 
questions. Two of these are directed at the subjects’ assessments on whether 
the same investment into some other HDF capacity would result in higher 
political and military returns on the investment (Questions 24 & 25). The other 
two queries relate to the subjects’ perceptions about how necessary HUNSF is to 
the functioning of the HDF and whether other capabilities should receive more 
attention instead of HUNSF (Questions 26 & 27).82 
B. ANALYSIS OF THE BUREAUCRATIC ENVIRONMENT 
In this section, first the independent and dependent variables will be 
analyzed with the intent to determine their relevance and weight. Then 
regression testing will be used to explain and analyze the causal mechanisms 
between the independent and dependent variables. The goal of the evaluation is 
to find out about the fit and significance of the model and to clarify whether the 
statistical analysis of the data is congruent with the theoretical expectations. 
                                            
82 DV4 is generated by dividing the sum of the responses to Q26 and Q27 with the sum of 
Q24 and 25: DV4=Σ (R26+R27) / (R24+R25). 
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1. Statistical (Descriptive) Analysis of the Variables 
Among the independent variables, organizational exposure has the 
highest mean with a smaller standard deviation. This suggests that the majority 
of the subjects, or the group they belong to, were exposed to HUNSF related 
issues with very alike and high frequency. This result adds considerable weight 
to this independent variable. 
The independent variable with the second highest mean is operational 
exposure with sizeable standard deviation. The high standard deviation is likely 
to be rooted in the fact that the relevant question in the survey inquired about 
both the subjects’ experience in operational theaters and their exposure to SOF 
while they had been deployed. Although 81% of the subjects had operational 
background, a mere 53% percent of these subjects had first-hand experience of 
varying degree with SOF. 
The mean of the educational exposure variable is low with a very high 
standard deviation. This is congruent with the sample of the survey, as the 
overwhelming majority of the subjects were non-SOF personnel with marginal 
SOF education, whereas some of the SOF subjects had undergone substantial 
SOF training and/or education.  
Values Variable Mean (mean/max.) 
Standard 
deviation Pos. Neg. 
Independent     
1. Operational exposure 3.86 (48%) 2.60 8 1 
2. Educational exposure 7.43 (26%) 6.22 28 1 
3. Organizational exposure 5.95 (85%) 1.44 7 1 
4. Military value alignment 3.19 (32%) 1.80 10  0 
5. SF’s attitude to other forces 4.82 (69%) 1.63 7 1 
Dependent     
1. Relative attitude to SF 1.23 (22%) 0.35 5.5 0.19 
2. Perceived HUNSF ego 5.50 (78%) 1.63 7 1 
3. SF’s attitude to regulations 5.55 (79%) 1.48 1* 7* 
4. HUNSF’s perceived utility 2.18 (31%) 1.67 7  (2/14) 
Table 4.   Descriptive analysis of the variables 
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The 3.19 mean of the military value alignment variable is equally low. This 
means that of the ten general military organizational values the subjects were 
required to choose out of thirty-nine in Question 12, only an average of 3.19, or 
32%, corresponded with those they thought were HUNSF’s organizational 
values. While this is the result of an intentionally subjective assessment, the 
overarching perception of the subjects is that the organizational values of the 
conventional military and HUNSF are fundamentally different. 
The two strongest proxy dependent variables are HUNSF’s perceived 
attitude toward regulations and HUNSF assumed ego with means of 5.55 and 
5.50 respectively. The standard deviation is low in both cases, which signals a 
strong agreement among the subjects. For the variable depicting HUNSF’s 
perceived attitude toward regulations the scaling of the answers was such that 
higher values in the responses signaled more favorable answers for HUNSF. The 
mean of HUNSF’s perceived ego indicates that the subjects tended to 
agree/strongly agree with the statement that HUNSF believes special does 
translate as better and, hence, HUNSF considers itself better than the rest of the 
HDF. 
Similarly, the variable with regard to HUNSF’s attitude to regulations 
shows an equally strong agreement, as the subjects tended to concur/strongly 
concur that HUNSF is less “law abiding” than other HDF units.83 This survey 
result seems to underline the hypothesis that the conventional military 
considered HUNSF’s level of “law abidance” rather low.  
The subjects’ relative attitude towards HUNSF is captured in the first 
dependent variable. Here the mean is positioned toward the lower, less favorable 
end of the scale, indicating the subjects’ somewhat negative attitude to HUNSF. 
Table 5 portrays the relevant sub-questions and their statistical analysis in 
addition to the data shown in Table 4.  
                                            
83 Here the scale was labeled as such: 1: HUNSF follows the regulations more than other 
HDF units, 4: there is no difference between HUNSF and other units, 7: HUNSF is less likely to 
follow the regulations compared to other HDF units. 
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To what extent do you think the followings characterize HUNSF? 
Sub-question Attribute Mean Standard deviation 
High level of training positive 5.38 0.97 
Superior leadership positive 4.58 1.12 
Hardworking personnel positive 6.00 0.84 
Secrecy negative 5.24 0.83 
Despise of non-SF units/personnel negative 4.29 1.79 
HUNSF bends rules negative 3.76 2.06 
Table 5.   Descriptive statistics of the relative attitude to HUNSF  
The subjects’ attitude is not entirely negative, since they believe HUNSF 
to be highly trained and hardworking with means in the “agree” and “strongly 
agree domain,” and a low standard deviation in the case of the first two values. 
At the same time, HUNSF leadership and HUNSF’s despise of non-HUNSF 
personnel is in the “no strong opinion” realm. The high standard deviation of the 
last statement is also remarkable. This indicates a strong inconsistency among 
the responses with the mean remaining in the “no strong opinion” and the 
“somewhat agree” field. This is rather conflicting with the results of Question 19, 
explained above under HUNSF’s perceived utility, which may be the result of the 
more straightforward wording of the statement in Question 8. 
The last dependent variable is generated from four questions that all 
concern the subjects’ perceptions on the military and political utility of HUNSF. 
The mean of the responses indicates that the subjects are not convinced about 
HUNSF’s utility and necessity as an HDF capacity, since the value of the mean 
(2.18) is below the middle neutral figure (3.57) with a standard deviation of 1.67. 
2. Models84 
The model concerns the subjects’ relative attitude toward HUNSF in terms 
of the five independent variables. The model is believed to capture the 
tendencies and the variance that the independent variables cause, through the 
                                            
84 After having run all four possible regressions with the five independent variables and 
changing the proxy dependent variables, one regression model proved to be of significance. 
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proxy dependent variables, in the main dependent variable. The model, hence, is 
to test the hypotheses introduced in the first chapter.85 
The first hypothesis assumes that the relevant HDF personnel’s increased 
operational, educational and organizational exposure to HUNSF and special 
operations has a positive effect, through the positive change in the relative 
attitudes, on the permissiveness of the environment HUNSF operates in. In other 
words, increased interaction generates a more positive relative attitude in the 
conventional military towards HUNSF. It is also presupposed that this interaction 
increases HUNSF’s ambiguous perceived utility, and decreases the perception 
that HUNSF routinely bends rules. 
The second hypothesis concerns the military organizational values. The 
assumption is that the more closely aligned the military organizational values 
between the HDF and HUNSF are, the more favorable the abovementioned 
dependent variables are for HUNSF development and upkeep. For this 
hypothesis, another method besides regression will also be used for testing 
purposes. 
3. Regression Analysis 
Table 6 shows the regression’s results for the model’s dependent variable. 
The analysis conveys that the model is strong, since the R-squared value, “that is 
a summary measure that tells how well the sample regression line fits the 
data,”86 is beyond 0.5.87 The P-values are, on the other hand, higher than 0.05 in 
                                            
85 Since “the success of regression analysis depends on the availability of the appropriate 
data,” the data set has been tested for collinearity and multicollinearity in order to “measure the 
strength or degree of linear association” between the independent variables. The testing 
produced very small coefficients and variance inflation factors well below 10 (between 1.03 and 
1.48) for the independent variables. This predicts that the IVs are less likely to inflate one another 
and distort the overall results by producing large standard errors in the models. Other tests 
included Kernel diagnostics, Kameron and Trivedi’s test, Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity and the Ramsey RESET test. For the detailed regression results see Appendix 
B. 
 
Damodar N. Gujarati, Basic Econometrics, Third Edition (McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1995), 27, 322. 
86 Damodar N. Gujarati, Basic Econometrics, Third Edition (McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1995), 74.  
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the case of operational and organizational exposure and the values are very high 
in the case of educational exposure. Since the respective coefficient seems 
equally irrelevant, the impact of educational exposure seems substantively and 
statistically weak. It must also be noted that, due to the relatively small sample 
size, the size of the coefficients and the P-values should be treated with caution 
and the model needs to be analyzed with the intent of looking for trends rather 
than for particular and nuanced observations. 
The model itself can be described as Operational Exposure + 
Organizational Exposure—HUNSF’s Attitude to the HDF + Degree of Military 
Organizational Value Alignment = HDF’s Relative Attitude toward HUNSF. 
Independent variables (1-5) Coefficient  P-value 
Operational exposure -0.033 0.186 
Educational exposure -0.000 0.937 
Organizational exposure -0.062 0.160 
SF’s attitude to other forces -0.094 0.019 
Degree of mil. organizational value alignment  0.074 0.031 
R-squared 
0.61 
Table 6.   Regression results: relative attitude toward HUNSF 
Organizational exposure has a relatively low negative coefficient and, 
thus, effect on the dependent variable. If we downplay the respective P-value, 
organizational exposure to HUNSF has a small negative effect on the subjects’ 
relative attitude toward HUNSF. Operational exposure is stronger in terms of the 
P-value but has a lower coefficient that negatively affects the dependent variable. 
HUNSF’s attitude toward the HDF negatively influences the relative 
attitudes of the latter toward HUNSF. This is of no particular surprise—unlike the 
                                            
87 “The R-squared is the proportion of variance in the dependent variable [relative attitude 
toward HUNSF] which can be explained by the independent variables [operational, educational 
and organizational exposure and the degree of military value alignment].” R-squared is a value 
between 0 and 1. The higher the value, the higher the “fit” or the accuracy of the regression 
model. 
 
UCLA: Academic Technology Services, Statistical Consulting Group, Stata Annotated Output 
Regression Analysis, http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/output/reg_output.htm (accessed March 
19, 2010). 
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trends with regard to operational exposure. The degree of military organizational 
value alignment is of significance. Though its coefficient is small, the “return on 
investment” into this variable definitely produces consistent “profit” on the relative 
attitude of the subjects, since the respective P-value is very low, which indicates 
a high statistical confidence. 
a. Organizational Values: Differences in Preferences 
Since the military organizational values’ alignment proved to be the 
most significant in the statistical analysis above, this arrangement deserves 
further analysis. The overarching perception of the subjects was that the 
organizational values of the conventional military and HUNSF are fundamentally 
different. In terms of the general military organizational values in Question 12, 
nine of them were chosen by at least ten subjects, while seven perceived 
HUNSF values scored at least ten hits by the subjects. The only value that was 
marked at least by ten subjects (48%) in both Questions 12 and 15 is teamwork. 
In Questions 14 and 16, the subjects were asked to single out at 
most five values they thought HUNSF (in Question 14) and the HDF (in Question 
16) should promote more than they did. For HUNSF, the results indicate the 
subjects’ a strong desire for more interaction with the HDF. 
Collaboration/cooperation scored seven and teamwork nine hits respectively. 
These are notably higher than the other values scored in the same question. This 
result clearly indicates that the subjects would prefer to interact a good deal more 
with HUNSF than it is currently the case. The indirect inference is that there is 
receptiveness in the environment for a more open and engaging HUNSF. 
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Organizational value Hits HUNSF should foster more 
Discipline/Order 15 4 
Teamwork 12 9 
Collaboration/Cooperation 12 7 
Loyalty 12 1 
Responsibility 12 1 
Dependability 12 1 
Efficiency 11 2 
Flexibility 10 3 
Accuracy 10 2 
Table 7.   Most relevant general military organizational values 
Apart from the values listed in Table 7, respect and 
rules/regulations also scored relatively high on the “HUNSF should foster more” 
question (five and three hits respectively). This, along with the four markings of 
discipline/order, strengthens the notion indicated by the statistical analysis of the 
independent and the dependent variables: the subjects were not particularly 
satisfied with HUNSF’s perceived attitude to regulations and toward the 
conventional military. By combining these and the observations in the above 
paragraph, we can conclude that there is a strong desire for more interaction with 
HUNSF on the condition that HUNSF is seen to be more respectful of the 
conventional military and the way it works. 
Question 16 of the survey captured the subjects’ assumptions 
about HUNSF’s values. The most often chosen characteristics are listed in Table 
7. Dedication, ambition and courage scored amazingly high; they were marked 
by more than 70% of the subjects. Diversity, dignity, teamwork and challenge 
were pointed out by almost 50% of the subjects. This is a clear sign that the 
subjects had tremendous respect for what HUNSF is and what it does. What 
seems to concern the subjects is how HUNSF goes about business in terms of 
“law abidance” and respect for the conventional military. This finding, again, is of 
substance, as it signals the subjects’ general acceptance and receptiveness for 
HUNSF. The implication can well be a potentially accommodating bureaucratic 
operating environment for HUNSF. 
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Organizational value Hits HDF should foster more 
Ambition 16 5 
Dedication 16 2 
Courage 15 2 
Accomplishment 12 5 
Teamwork 11 0 
Dignity 10 0 
Diversity 10 0 
Collectivism 9 7 
Challenge 9 6 
Table 8.   Perceived most relevant HUNSF military organizational values  
It must be noted that in Question 14 the subjects were asked to 
mark the actual standards they thought characterized HUNSF most, while in 
Question 12 they were to choose general military values for a military. To explore 
this latter probe more, Question 13 inquired the extent, on a one to seven scale, 
to which the subjects thought the general military values they picked in the 
previous question were valid for the HDF. The mean of the responses (3.61) is 
between the “not particularly” and the “no strong opinion” field with a high level of 
agreement among the subjects (the standard deviation is 0.92). This indicates 
the subjects’ aspiration for a more value-oriented HDF that may also be the 
reason for the displayed receptiveness for HUNSF, since they perceive HUNSF 
as a very much value-centric organization. 
As for the values the subjects would probably prefer, apart from the 
ones they singled out as general military standards shown in Table 6, the ones 
that scored high on the HUNSF value question are telling. Collectivism, 
challenge, ambition and accomplishment are the military organizational traits that 
subjects chose most often as HUNSF attributes that the HDF ought to advance 
more.88 Flexibility and improvement are not listed in Table 7, though these also 
scored relatively high with four markings each. On the other hand, diversity and 
                                            
88 Collectivism was translated into the Hungarian questionnaires as összetartozás. This, 
unlike the English word, is neither a negative nor a loaded term, and it is not associated with 
communism or socialism. Instead, the translation emphasizes a sense of “we belong together” 
and an orientation that favors group/organizational interests instead of individual ones. 
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dignity, although they scored high among the perceived HUNSF values, were not 
chosen by any of the subjects as the ones that should be promoted in the HDF. 
These findings indicate a desire for a clearly articulated mission for 
the HDF that can be easily translated into everyday life and what the personnel 
can identify themselves with and pursue. The high scores of challenge and 
ambition appear to be signs of the HDF personnel’s aspiration for more 
demanding and higher-aiming tasks and objectives, whereas those of 
accomplishment, collectivism and improvement are indicators of strong wishes 
for shared and significant organizational successes. Flexibility can be interpreted 
as the appreciation of and longing for an increased organizational 
responsiveness and ability to adapt to the challenges of the complex and 
dynamic environment. 
In summation, the organizational values of the (conventional) 
military and HUNSF were found fundamentally different with hardly any overlap. 
The traditional military values are more performance and process oriented, while 
the HUNSF values seem to be more dynamic and effects focused. These 
findings are well aligned with the organizational design theory explored in 
Chapter III. This evaluation is by no means a rank-ordering type estimate but a 
justifiable observation based on the survey data. 
The difference in preferred organizational values is obvious; 
however, this difference is only a source of conflict between the parties 
concerned if these diverse traits are not mutually appreciated. The data analysis 
shows that HDF’s bureaucratic environment is generally receptive toward 
HUNSF and would prefer more interaction with HUNSF. The HDF only demands 
more responsibility and respect from HUNSF in return.  This finding is not even 
particularly counterintuitive and does not appear to require HUNSF to give up 
any of its truly precious values but to add humbleness to the list. Interestingly 
enough, the analysis of the answers also signals the responders’ strong desire 
for some changes to the bureaucratic environment to encompass some of the 
perceived, and preferred, HUNSF attributes. 
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C. OVERALL RESEARCH RESULTS VS. EXPECTATIONS 
In general terms, the expectation of the research was that the identified 
independent variables would cause variance on the dependent variable. Both the 
descriptive and the regression analysis results proved to be only partially aligned 
with the particular expectations, although the overall survey result analysis still 
significantly reinforces the hypotheses and validates the expectations. 
Operational exposure has a small negative effect on the bureaucratic 
environment’s tolerance for HUNSF. This is most likely the result of the subjects’ 
unfavorable experiences with special operations forces. Less than 30% of the 
subjects had operational experience with SOF, as HUNSF has mostly been 
deployed with allied forces for special operations purposes.89 Thus, the variable’s 
adverse effect on the dependent variable is most likely the net result of HUNSF 
personnel’s deployment to non-SOF operations with other HDF personnel and 
the subjects’ experience with SOF other than HUNSF. 
Similarly, organizational exposure is of adverse effect to a certain extent. It 
signals that the subjects’ engagement with HUNSF in a bureaucratic setting has 
created a non-permissive atmosphere for HUNSF. A probable explanation might 
be that the dynamic nature of HUNSF’s early development and its struggle for 
survival placed undue demands on the bureaucracy that was unsuited and  
 
 
                                            
89 The empirical research, since it was specifically directed at the bureaucratic environment, 
did not address the specific group of HDF members who have served jointly with HUNSF in 
NATO ISAF missions such as the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT) and the 
Kabul International Airport. In the case of the OMLT, conventional and SF forces, along with 
elements of the U.S. Ohio National Guard, serve together and provide training and advising for a 
particular Kandak of the Afghan National Army. As for the KAIA mission, the HDF provided the 
commander and the bulk of the personnel for the operation of the airport. The HDF element 
included a Special Operations Task Unit for close protection purposes. These joint experiences’ 
effects that are relevant to the present research offer a field for further research. Since the 
success of these operations required regular and institutionalized cooperation from both the 
conventional and the SOF elements, greater liking and mutual respect were the likely outcomes 
in accordance with Cialdini who found that “cooperation is a powerful cause of liking.” 
 
Robert B. Cialdini, Influence–The Psychology of Persuasion, Revised edition (New York: Collins 
Business, 2007), 185. 
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unprepared for both the urgency and the nature of such requests. The more often 
the subjects were exposed to such situations in the organization, the more 
frustration they had to cope with.90 
HUNSF’s attitude toward the subjects/conventional military proved to be a 
strong variable with a relatively high negative effect on the dependent variable. 
This is not counterintuitive, as no one likes to be disrespected and if someone is, 
then they are less likely to be tolerant with their counterpart. 
The similarity of military values caused the second most significant 
variance on the dependent variable, only the variance was positive this time. 
More closely aligned military values between the conventional and special forces 
increase the permissiveness of the bureaucratic environment. The analysis also 
revealed that the overlap between the two value sets in the sample was very thin. 
The general military values and the ones the subjects thought were of HUNSF’s 
seemed to point toward two entirely different organizations and preferences. This 
finding reinforces the explanations provided by the study of organizational design 
theory. 
The statistical analysis of the responses to the survey questions also 
disclosed that the majority of the responders agreed/strongly agreed that HUNSF 
thought it was better than the conventional military and tended to disregard the 
regulations more than other HDF units. While there was no particular expectation 
attached to these observations, these results correspond with Cohen’s findings 
on “elite units.” On the other hand, the responders appear to somewhat accept  
 
 
                                            
90 This explanation with regard to the absence of the desired positive effect of the operational 
and organizational exposure variables on the dependent variable is reinforced by the results of 
three independent empirical psychological researches that are quoted by Cialdini in his book on 
influence: “[R]esearch shows that becoming familiar with something through repeated contact 
doesn’t necessarily cause greater liking. In fact, continued exposure to a person or object under 
unpleasant conditions such as frustration, conflict, or competition leads to less liking.” 
 
Robert B. Cialdini, Influence–The Psychology of Persuasion, Revised edition (New York: Collins 
Business, 2007), 178. 
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HUNSF’s elite status in terms of its personnel, as they rather agreed (standard 
deviation: 1.6) that HUNSF tried to recruit valuable human resources for itself 
(mean: 5.2 on a 1 through 7 scale). 
 
Table 9.   Subjects’ perceptions of HUNSF tasks 
The research reinforces the hypothesis that the general understanding of 
special forces and special operations is very superficial. Table 8 illustrates the 
subjects’ responses (in percentage) to Question 11. The number of choices was 
unlimited and the options purposefully included some ambiguity. Although only 
three answers were perfectly correct, none of them was false, as they were 
subsets of the main tasks or were additional ones. Special reconnaissance, 
direct actions and the ill-defined counterterrorism were the ones chosen by more 
than 70% of the subjects. Whereas the first two are, indeed, core tasks of 
HUNSF, they are also the most conventional ones. Operations with strategic 
military/political impact and training and advising of allied forces, that capture the 
essence of SF, scored 48 and 52% respectively. 
The inadequate and insufficient understanding of special forces and their 
operations was reinforced by Question 9 where there were no choices offered 
and the results were generated entirely from the subjects’ replies (Table 9). Here 
“different tasks” as a distinction was mentioned in more than 40% of the 
responses, which fact is somewhat contradictory to the relevant findings of the 
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previously discussed question. This response indicates that the subjects tend to 
see the differences more in terms of tasks than anything else, but still consider 
those tasks to be largely conventional (direct actions, special reconnaissance). 
This assumption is reinforced by another set of answers where 73% stated that 
some special operations can be conducted by conventional forces and others 
cannot. While this is certainly true, the overarching assumption appears to be 
that SF is better and even specially trained and better equipped, but still not 
“special.” These responses are of no surprise given that the majority of the 
subjects, just like the HDF, never had a chance to study special operations (less 
than one fourth of the responders considered their SOF education and training 
level significant). More familiarity with the HUNSF tasks and the nature of special 
operations would probably positively influence the relevant audience’s perception 
with regard to HUNSF’s role in the HDF’s task set. 
 
Table 10.   Alleged differences between special and conventional forces 
HUNSF’s perceived military and political utility was found low (Questions 
24-27). This is in line with the expectations, though the results are worse than 
expected. Interestingly enough, the responses to the last survey question are 
somewhat contradictory to the above outcome. To the question of what HDF 
capabilities should be preferred in the place of the HDF’s special forces capacity, 
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71% chose to answer that none of the offered ought to be preferred in the place 
of HUNSF, as HUNSF is an important capability of the military. While the variable 
that captures HUNSF’s utility has probably more latitude, since the questions that 
were combined into this variable were less direct, in the course of a prospect 
education and information “campaign” not only the issue of what is HUNSF’s 
utility needs to be addressed, but also the why and just how exactly is HUNSF a 
useful capability of the HDF. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The empirical research and the statistical analysis of the gathered data 
were used to test the hypotheses and the findings generally correlate with the 
expectations. In cases where this correlation is weak or contrary to what was 
anticipated, sound explanations could be found. 
Increasingly corresponding military values of the conventional military’s 
bureaucratic environment and that of associated with HUNSF by the subjects 
have been found the most relevant independent variable that produces the 
desirable variance on the dependent variable, the permissiveness of HUNSF’s 
immediate operating environment. On the other hand, a decrease in HUNSF’s 
apparently disrespectful attitude toward the conventional military also inducts 
positive variance in the dependent variable. 
The analysis also found that the bureaucratic environment appears to be 
generally receptive to an increased interaction with HUNSF and is essentially 
approving of HUNSF.  This is regardless of the proven fact that the subjects in 
the representative sample displayed very limited understanding of special forces 
and special operations and the potentials thereof.  The research also ascertained 
that the discrimination between special forces/operations and conventional 
forces/operations is based on speculative rather than informational and 
educational grounds.  The rationale for this is that the special operations capacity 
is a recent virtue of the HDF that has not been fully incorporated into the 
standard military education and training system.  Moreover, the secretiveness 
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that has characterized HUNSF since its formation, as this was affirmed by the 
research, has also disabled the flow of information on HUNSF. 
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR HUNSF AND THE HDF 
The analysis of the empirical research, and HUNSF’s domestic operating 
environment, highlights challenges in HUNSF’s development and upkeep that 
are, for the most part, non-material in nature. Notwithstanding the effects of the 
current unfavorable financial-economic circumstances, the time period 
characterized by these adverse conditions may be utilized for non-materiel 
investments into, and adjustments to, HUNSF and its bureaucratic environment. 
The transition from the current focus on SF to a more meaningful SOF capacity 
requires a less disrespectful and isolated HUNSF, enhanced and targeted 
communication, investment into SOF human capital on levels other than the 
tactical, fine-tuning the organizational command and control relationships and the 
unification of SOF elements. 
A. THE END OF ISOLATION 
Regardless of whether the first stage of HUNSF development was 
rightfully surrounded with secrecy, this research suggests that the consolidation 
of HUNSF needs much less of such protective concealment. The preservation 
and proper employment of the SF capacity, as the historical examples discussed 
in Chapter III indicate, require the stakeholders and the bureaucracy to know and 
understand the capabilities and limitations of HUNSF, SOF and special 
operations.91 This requires more substantial communication, although “going 
public” also has restrictions. Differentiation must be made between information 
that has been simply inaccessible and that which is actively kept secret or 
confidential.92 
                                            
91 The relevant results of the empirical research discussed in the previous chapter justified 
the assumption with regard to the lack of appropriate understanding of SOF and special 
operations by the HDF as well as the unduly high level of secrecy that surrounds HUNSF.  
92 Sissela Bok, Secrets–On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1989), 217. 
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1. The Balance Between Confidentiality and Openness 
Understandably, thinning the secrecy screen may be seen as a threat to 
HUNSF’s status quo, power and authority. Operations and information security 
(OPSEC & INFOSEC) concerns may be (mis)used to hinder the more generous 
flow of information with regard to HUNSF and also for shutting down debate. 
Operations and information security are definitely legitimate concerns if they are 
used for what they are intended: the concealment of information that, when 
exploited, can have an adverse effects on own actions and/or the capacity to 
conduct them. 
Based on Bok’s observations, the potential risks of the excessive 
collective and individual secrecy that were highlighted by the research93 include 
but are not limited to: increased chance for exercising power without 
accountability; decreased willingness to cooperate with others; limited chances of 
disapproval or sanctions of one’s actions.94 Moreover, undue secrecy enables 
“discrimination … between insider and outsider, between those apart and all 
others.”95 The least desirable effect of unwarranted secrecy is almost certainly 
that it can reduce the sense of 
[…] responsibility for joint decisions and facilitate all forms of 
skewed or careless judgment, including that exhibited in taking 
needless risks. It offers participants a shield against outside 
criticism, and can obscure the possibilities of failure.96 
                                            
93 As discussed in the previous chapter, the subjects in the survey found secrecy a trait that 
characterizes HUNSF (on the 1 through 7 scale, the mean of the answers is 5.24 with a relatively 
low level of standard deviation).  
94 Sissela Bok, Secrets-On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1989), 106–111. 
95 Sissela Bok, Secrets-On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1989), 110. 
96 Sissela Bok, Secrets-On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1989), 109. 
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The survey results are consistent with this observation.97 A widely known 
U.S. example of what disproportionate secrecy can lead to is the case of the 
badly failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt, known as Operation Eagle Claw, 
where obsession with security made coordination between forces involved next 
to impossible and also severely limited the sound judgment of key political and 
military decision makers.98 
As for other possible concerns against a more open HUNSF, the 
preservation of the perceived status quo, power and authority are mostly 
meaningful from an individualistic perspective. Given that HUNSF is a “public 
venture” as an element of the HDF that is one of the pillars of state power, 
alleged or actual individual (e.g., career) interests need to be aligned with those 
of the organization. This argument is unlikely to have much persuasive power in 
a highly individualist society and in a rightfully competitive military. Henceforth, 
organizational incentives need to be provided that can effectively promote both 
organizational and individual interest. The issue of incentives and commitment 
will, henceforth, be revisited in a subsequent section. 
2. Going Public on Multiple Fronts 
Disproportionate openness can equally be counterproductive or irrelevant. 
The latter is the case when the disclosed information is limited to “public 
relations,” that only conveys rosy images and success stories, or to public affairs 
with largely neutral messages. In support of finding the right balance between 
what can be revealed and what ought to be preserved, Bok suggests the “test of 
actual publicity” and argues for the 
                                            
97 The subjects’ observations on secrecy seem to be independent from their attitude to 
HUNSF, since there cannot be found any strong correlation between any given subject’s 
perception of HUNSF secrecy and his level of value alignment with HUNSF values or his 
perceptions about HUNSF disrespect toward the HDF. Subjects who gave high points for 
HUNSF’s secrecy were found to have both low and higher military organizational value alignment. 
Their answers’ variance to the question of whether HUNSF disregards the conventional military 
was also considerable. 
98 Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options-Special Operations as an Instrument of the 
U.S. Foreign Policy (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 114-151. 
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[…] necessity to articulate one’s own position carefully, to defend it 
against unexpected counterarguments, to take opposing views into 
consideration, to reveal the steps of reasoning one has used, and 
to state openly the principles to which one appeals.99 
Actual publicity should be at least twofold for HUNSF: first, it needs to be 
manifested in an education and training portfolio for select non-SF JFC (and 
MoD) personnel that can and will form the supportive environmental segment for 
future HUNSOF.100 On the tactical level, the recently introduced enhanced joint 
training with other, mainly SOF or SOF capable, HDF units will be amended by 
providing extensive and unique training opportunities for HDF units.101 
The second portfolio concerns the management of HUNSF-related 
information that is released to the public in general and to the military in 
particular.102 HUNSOF’s role in a more open communication can be that of a 
trailblazer that also draws the attention of the targeted audiences to the 
messages. On the Web sites intended for public access and for internal military 
communication respectively, provided that the majority of the changes suggested 
in Appendix C are realized in accordance with the JFC Commander’s intent, 
                                            
99 Sissela Bok, Secrets-On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1989), 114. 
100 Even though the educational exposure did not prove to be a strong predictor during the 
statistical analysis, SOF education is still considered a key element of the broader effort to shape 
the environment. This is discussed in a subsequent section in detail. 
101 The 34th SF Battalion has had, since its establishment, joint exchange training events 
with non-military anti-terrorist forces. Cooperation with other HDF units has been rather limited so 
far. Nonetheless, some of the Military Occupational Specialty trainings during the 2008 national 
Special Forces Qualification Course were open to applicants from units other than the 34th SF 
Battalion. 
102 The MoD has been traditionally one of the most pragmatic among government agencies 
in the utilization of modern media. A clear sign of this modernity is that some of the social 
networking Web 2.0 applications are now embedded into the HDF’s official Web site and the fact 
that there are several MoD-run Web sites. The vehicles of modern Web-based communication 
and the capacity to maintain and manage them are, therefore, in existence; it is only necessary to 
structure them along the lines of target audience, or stakeholders, and expected benefits. Divided 
across the lines of stakeholders, the MoD and the HDF should probably consider domestic public, 
internal and international target audiences. This division more or less determines the functions, 
the content and the accessibility of the respective Web sites. The idea behind this information 
campaign is that the relevant result of the empirical research (answers to Question 4) shows that 
the subjects’ second most significant source of information on SOF and special operations was 
books and documentaries (33%). This indicates a certain level of interest in the subject that could 
be elaborated by more readily available, select and channeled non-fictional content. 
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HUNSF needs to be first of the among the HDF and MoD elements that achieves 
actual publicity. This must be paralleled with user-created and official accounts of 
deployed units’ experiences and activity, as those are also “attention catchers” by 
virtue of human nature: we want to have our say and uncover mysteries (of 
combat). 
This proposal is undoubtedly a considerable departure from today’s policy 
of “public relations.” The potential benefits, however, seem to outweigh the likely 
risks. Releasing SOF tasks, organization, SF acceptance criteria, general 
information on and accounts of weaponry and training should attract visitors by 
the virtue of fact that these are “special.”103 Non-sensitive reports and diaries of 
past combat operations that have no adverse impact on current and future ones 
but can contribute to enhanced training and doctrine, increased public attention 
and appreciation involve no political or military risk whatsoever, on the condition 
that information security is abided. The major stumbling block here is that 
information security, as noted in the first section of this chapter, may be 
purposefully or unintentionally ill-defined and hinder the implementation of a 
more open and modern communications strategy. 
B. HUMANS ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN HARDWARE104 
The second element of the “actual publicity” is an education and training 
portfolio for select non-SF personnel. The past five years of HUNSF development 
has constructed a deployable tactical Special Forces capability for the HDF. Also, 
                                            
103 To be successful, such campaign obviously requires more than mere publicity. The 
contents released must target specific audiences with specific messages on adequate channels 
of communication in order to gain attention and result in the desired attitudes and behavior of the 
recipients. 
104 The title of this section refers to one of the five so-called SOF Truths. The often-quoted 
SOF Truths originate from the former U.S. Army Colonel, John M. Collins, although the fifth Truth 
is less well known than the first four. The full set of SOF Truths: 1) Humans are more important 
than hardware; 2) Their quality is more important than quantities; 3) Special Operations Forces 
cannot be mass-produced; 4) Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur; 5) 
Most special operations require non-SOF assistance. 
 
John M. Collins, United States and Soviet Special Operations: A Study (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 
1987), xiii. 
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as discussed in Chapter III, the second phase of SF evolution requires legislative 
action and experienced and incentivized facilitators within and outside the 
military. Recognizing that the current tactical capability and capacity still need to 
be improved, the second stage of HUNSF evolution desperately needs 
facilitators at the operational and strategic level. This poses a huge but 
resolvable challenge for HUNSF. Since organizations are often poorly equipped 
to perform diverse tasks well, the resolution comes through compromises. 
The first SOF truth, humans are more important than hardware, is not 
limited to SOF operators.105 This is especially true in the present case of HUNSF 
with its very limited representation and, hence, leverage, or the lack thereof, at 
the operational and strategic level. Officers and non-commissioned officers with 
tactical level training and experience are much needed in the 34th SF Battalion 
and, due to the small size of the unit, it is very unlikely that in the near future 
such expertise will be available in sufficient quality and quantity for the staffing of 
operational and strategic level headquarters and command elements such as the 
JFC and the MoD. One of the two elements of the proposed solution to this issue 
is presented here, while the other component, that concerns organizational 
changes, is discussed in the subsequent section of the current chapter. 
1. Bureaucratic Guerrillas 
HUNSF’s representation within the JFC is limited to a Special Operations 
Section with a handful of positions within the J37 Operations and Training 
Branch. At the strategic level, in the MoD, there is virtually no dedicated 
representation whatsoever; HUNSF-related issues are primarily dealt with by 
personnel for whom these are additional tasks.106 As noted in the Introduction, 
                                            
105 The respective empiric research results (in Question 8) found that tactical SOF operators 
are considered well trained and hardworking by the subjects. The survey produced less clear 
results with regard to whether HUNSF possessed high-tech hardware (mean around the median: 
4.28).  
106 The subjects in the survey seemed to be aware of this notion, as they only “somewhat 
agreed” (mean 4.71) to the statement that HUNSF had dedicated advocates within the JFC and 
the MoD (Question 8). 
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HUNSF needs to develop an unconventional approach that is capable of, among 
other things, shaping the environment in which it operates without turning it 
against itself. This shaping includes defining allies as broadly as possible and 
“adversaries” as narrowly as possible. Apart from invaluable passive allies, who 
are not antagonistic towards HUNSF, HUNSF needs active supporters in the 
bureaucratic environment, who actually “get things done.” The group of such 
allies can be considered as bureaucratic guerrillas who are selected, trained, 
equipped, organized and inspired by SOF operators and “fight” for the benefit of 
both their own individual interests and those of the organization.107 
In the JFC there is a Special Operations Working Group (SOWG) that 
draws members from the key branches and departments of the organization and 
which convenes regularly. The members, however, are delegated by their 
branches or departments and not selected for the SOWG based on their SOF 
backgrounds or dedication to the cause. The SOF-related tasks are in addition to 
the members’ workload and result in no particular benefits for those who perform 
them. In practice, compliance and willingness to substantially contribute is 
contingent upon the individual’s main workload and his or her personal affections 
towards the case at hand and not by the individual’s commitment to HUNSF. This 
is not to say that the SOWG has been entirely ineffective or unsuccessful; very 
much the contrary. Yet, a more permanent and SOF-educated, devoted core of 
non-SOF staff personnel could have achieved even more. 
The creation of dedicated non-SOF personnel for the support of the 
broader SOF development has to overcome at least two major burdens—
assuming that such education and training program receive a green light. 
Incentives must be offered for the department and branch chiefs, so that they 
consent for their subordinates’ participation in the SOF education and training 
                                            
107 It may seem odd to emphasize the significance of organizational exposure of non-SOF 
personnel to SOF, since the regression analysis in the previous chapter indicated a negative 
correlation between such exposure and the relative attitude toward HUNSF. The objective here is 
to reverse-engineer the process, as limiting the organizational exposure is not a viable option for 
HUNSF, because that would only increase its isolation. 
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program. Second, incentives need to be offered for the personnel, so they would 
want to undergo selection and the subsequent SOF program and then would be 
duty-bound for active HUNSOF support as an additional task to their workload.108 
The respective branch chiefs must be engaged by SOF personnel whom 
the given branch chief would consider a credible partner. The one-on-one type 
discussions must address both the concerns the engaged senior officer is likely 
to raise in opposition and also the potential benefits in terms of the increased 
authority the department or the branch can gain by delegating one or two staff 
officers to HUNSOF related tasks. The delegation of staff members can provide 
the branch chiefs with both timely information on and a sense of control over 
ever-occurring HUNSOF-related matters. 
The prospective guerrillas’ incentives include the participation in the 
education and training program (discussed later in detail) can offer. Also, the 
positive examples of HDF and MoD HUNSOF staff personnel’s achievement can 
be inspiring. Most of them, just like the future guerrillas, had no substantive 
tactical level SOF background prior to their enrollment into or affiliation with 
HUNSOF. Moreover, the individual incentives would include “tabbing” the 
“guerrillas.” Upon the completion of the selection and the first segment of the 
education and training program, the non-organizational SOF staff personnel 
would be awarded with the distinctive “Special Operations Forces—Staff” tab in 
recognition of their achievement and effort.109 The “tabbing” may seem awfully 
                                            
108 Incentives or rewards are especially difficult to create in government bureaucracies such 
as the military. Wilson makes note of “nonmaterial awards” and list them as “a sense of duty and 
purpose, the status that derives from individual recognition and personal power, and the 
associational benefits that come from being part of an organization (or a small group within that 
organization) that is highly regarded by its members or by society at large.” Since the 
organizational values of HUNSF were generally “highly regarded” by the subjects and it is also a 
“small group” within the larger organization of the JFC and the HDF, it is reasonable to assume 
that Wilson’s nonmaterial rewards could, indeed, be function as incentives for prospect 
“guerrillas.” 
 
James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it, New Edition, 
2000 (Basic Books, Inc., 1989), 157–158. 
109 The broad idea of “tabbing” originates from one of the numerous discussions between the 
author and Lieutenant Colonel Porkoláb.  
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trivial, though it is believed to have considerable motivational power, as it signals 
an accomplishment for others and offers a sense of belonging to a distinct group 
for the bearer.110 
2. Selection, Assessment, Education, and Training 
The screening process for the selection and assessment must target 
individuals who, if enrolled, are likely to be successful. Hence, screening need to 
include past performance with regard to HUNSF support and peer review, or 
referencing, based on reasonably objective observations and judgment. The 
selection and assessment process must be swift and simple and focus on mainly 
personal traits rather than physical ones, although physical fitness will be 
examined. The goal is not to put undue emphasis on the physical attributes, as 
this may well discourage candidates. Moreover, the program is not intended to 
find tactical operators but to create a commitment to SOF and a sense of mission 
among the candidates by providing them with SOF education and an alternative 
type of organizational exposure to SOF.111 The ultimate objective is to turn over 
the negative trend found in the model’s regression analysis with regard to the 
organizational exposure variable and to make educational exposure a significant 
element of the equation. In this regard, education and organizational exposure  
 
 
                                            
110 The secondary and equally desired effect of “tabbing,” besides as a sign of genuine 
appreciation of accomplishment, is that it visibly associates the bearer with SOF and creates both 
a sign and a sense of commitment. To increase this desirable effect, the “tabbing ceremony” 
needs covered by military media where the names of the “guerillas,” with their consent, are also 
published. The tabbing must be preceded by another campaign among the “proper” SOF 
elements, as their acceptance of the tabbed personnel as credible future partners is of vital 
importance for the program. 
 
Robert B. Cialdini, Influence-The Psychology of Persuasion, Revised edition (New York: Collins 
Business, 2007), 101. 
111 This can also be understood as extending the sense of “specialness” of SOF to the 
candidates. While this may appear a manipulative attempt, it must be understood that such move 
will only result in the desired effect on the long run, if the motives behind extending “specialness” 
are genuine as opposed to manipulative. On the issue of specialness and elites see: 
Bernd Horn, "Military Ethos," National Defence and the Canadian Forces, July 17, 2008, 
http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo8/no4/horn-eng.asp (accessed March 12, 2010). 
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are vehicles for cooperation. Henceforth, the program combines intense and 
broadened organizational and operational/strategic level educational exposure to 
both SOF theory and practice. 
The selection criteria will be limited to the successful completion of the 
physical fitness standards of the level directly above the one the individual is 
required to meet in his position. The criteria for the assessment need to be 
equally clear-cut and should include the possession of at least a national and 
NATO secret type security clearance and NATO STANAG 6001 2.2.2.2 (or 
equivalent) English proficiency. What is even more important, an assessment 
criteria needs to be developed that evaluates the level of the candidate’s 
organizational military value alignment in terms of his preferences for general 
and SOF values—as discussed in the analytic chapter. Hence, since the intent is 
to create a group of facilitators for HUNSF development at the operational and 
strategic level, the degree of value alignment is of major concern in the 
assessment process. 
The selection and assessment is to be conducted as the “0” phase (Day 1) 
of the two-week initial program in an environment that is physically separated 
from both the MoD and the JFC and by SOF cadre from the MoD and the JFC to 
mitigate rank and status concerns. Following the (physical) selection, which is 
conducted by age groups with the criteria that the group as a whole needs to 
meet the standards in order to pass, the English proficiency assessment is 
conducted in the form of ten to fifteen-minute individual presentations on subjects 
selected by the candidates from a list some days prior to the beginning of the 
program. The list would contain topics with their relevant background materiel on 
historical SOF actions, excerpts from the AJP 3.5 Special Operations Policy and 
HDF SOF contents (doctrine, principles of HUNSOF employment, et cetera). The 
presentations are evaluated by both the cadre and the peers based on pre-
prepared criteria that address the comprehensiveness and style of the brief as 
well as the self-confidence of the briefer. The assessment with regard to the 
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organizational values is conducted by the means of standardized sheets. The 
comprehensive evaluation of the candidates is conducted individually. 
The following four days of the program are focused around team-building 
type activities to advance a sense of camaraderie; historic SOF missions (in 
English); the organization and tasks of national and allied SOF; SOF command, 
control and coordination elements (in English); SOF operations planning 
principles; and the assessment of recent HUNSOF missions. The remaining days 
of the initial program will be incorporated into the HDF 34th SF Battalion’s annual 
major field exercise and the on-going NATO Special Forces Qualification Course 
(NSFQC). Apart from participating in the exercise as staff augmentation in 
dedicated positions, the trainees will familiarize themselves with the Battalion’s 
personnel, conduct basic weapons and equipment training on SOF-specific 
equipment with subsequent day and night live-fire exercises alongside with the 
trainees of the NSFQC. Upon the completion of the program, the candidates are 
awarded the SOF-Staff tab. The program’s last day is dedicated for wrap-ups, 
backbriefs, course evaluation, administration, and redeployment. 
This first phase is deliberately short in duration so that the branch chiefs 
and department heads are more likely to allow for their subordinates’ 
participation. Moreover, this fourteen-day period is planned to be compact, 
interactive and informative. This phase is not intended to train fully functional 
SOF staff officers, but to build personal relationships between them and 
HUNSOF personnel and also generate affection for SOF and elaborate on 
already existing ties to SOF personnel that are likely to survive the test of future 
demanding tasks. 
The objective is also to screen the personnel for future SOF missions’ 
staff. Since HUNSOF is unlikely to have the capacity to fully staff higher 
headquarter positions required of a deployed Special Operations Task Group. 
For this reason, the second segment of the program is meant for those who 
performed best in the initial program and are willing and have the potential for 
serving in SOF staff jobs either at deployed special operations headquarters or in 
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the national command and control elements. They will be enrolled in the relevant 
orientation and staff officer courses that NATO SOF HQ (NSHQ) offers and 
which are prerequisites for deploying with NATO SOF. 
The third element of the program is a three to five-day annual refresher for 
the personnel that have gone through at least the initial phase. In this segment, 
some of the cadre will come from among the SOF staff personnel that, by then, 
will have had either operational SOF experience or have been enrolled in one or 
more NSHQ courses. This segment also contains at least a full day spent with 
the HDF 34th SF Battalion and/or another HUNSOF unit. 
3. Investment Into the Future SOF 
The survey results show that the vast majority of personnel that 
participated have not been educated on SOF other than occasional, and very 
recent, seminars and courses. This is not surprising, since special operations are 
not included in the standard non-commissioned officer or officer training, even 
though the HDF has always had light infantry or ranger-type units with the 
capability to conduct such operations. 
Offering a complete set of course proposals for NCO training or officer 
education is far beyond the author’s expertise. Nonetheless, the National 
Defense University (NDU), where future and current military officers are 
educated, and the HDF Central Training Base, where the NCO training takes 
place, need to incorporate special operations into their academic curricula and 
training programs. The NDU has already made the first steps toward this 
direction; the design of the special operations curriculum requires the active 
participation of HUNSOF personnel with the appropriate level of relevant 
expertise. This is necessary, as the curriculum must be both recent and aligned 
with the operational needs in order for future officers and NCOs to have an 
appropriate and accurate awareness of national and NATO SOF. 
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In 2007, the NDU’s Kossuth Lajos Military Science Faculty initiated an 
education program for students at non-military universities and colleges.112 The 
program is built around the subject of basic national defense, and 3,238 students 
in higher education have been enrolled into the program to date. This student 
number is seemingly insignificant;113 however, the program is relatively fresh and 
such programs have no recent history in Hungary. Therefore, the program 
probably has some potential for increased enrollment. The inclusion of special 
operations into the program, if properly communicated, may attract more 
students to the program and can result in an increased public awareness in 
terms of the HDF’s capacities, and, thereby, improve the HDF’s status and 
already considerable public recognition. 
C. INTEGRATION WITHOUT ASSIMILATION 
This section is likely to create controversy, since the distinction between 
integration and assimilation in terms of SOF and the conventional military is not 
particularly clear-cut. Also, the preservation of SOF’s uniqueness (its 
organizational culture) is of legitimate concern. Any attempt to move closer to the 
conventional forces may raise the alarm and result in intense warnings against 
assimilation. On the other hand, the recent suggestion of the establishment of an 
IW Command or Adam’s idea of an Unconventional Operations Force, explained 
in Chapter III, are clearly proposals with the purpose of more distinction, though 
these are not necessarily met with wide and undivided enthusiasm. Additionally, 
Marquis cautions against casting different SOF units, such as SEALS, Special  
 
 
                                            
112  János Czank, Honvédelmi alapismeretek már négy felsőoktatási intézményben (Basic 
military education in four institutes for higher education), February 20, 2010, 
http://portal.zmne.hu/portal/page?_pageid=34,129339&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL 
(accessed March 12, 2010). 
113 This accumulated number is just above 1% of the total student number (381,000) in 
higher education in academic year 2008/2009. 
 
Ministry of Education and Culture, Statistical Yearbook of Education 2008/2009, Department of 
Administrative Coordination (Budapest: Ministry of Education and Culture, 2009), 10. 
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Forces and Rangers, “into a traditional unit organization for the ease of 
management,” as this would most likely result in the loss of distinctive 
organizational attributes.114 
All these are reasonable concerns with their core intents being applicable 
for HUNSF and the HDF. The notion of an IW Command would most likely be 
met with justifiable resistance in the HDF, since—due to HDF’s size, principal 
tasks and its joint force command structure—such command would be a massive 
overkill. The assemblage of the HDF’s core SOF units under conventional JFC 
command would be equally counterproductive and exactly the move Marquis 
cautions against. Nonetheless, some changes to the command and control 
structure as well as to the force structure are necessary for at least two reasons. 
First, the HDF, because of its size and limited capacity to project combat support 
and combat service support, must, and does, think in force capability packages 
rather than in mere units.  Second, for HUNSF values and capacities to be 
preserved, the SOFization of the current SF capacity is the way forward. The 
former statement should not require further explanation, since force capability 
packages have been the policy, but not necessarily the overarching practice, of 
HDF for some time. SOFization, on the other hand, may sound counterintuitive. 
1. Organizational Adjustments: Mutatis Mutandis  
This section proposes a SOF command and control relationship that does 
not require fundamental organizational changes to existing structures and 
appreciates the joint nature of the military’s present command and control 
arrangements, but still provides the HDF with the most basic command and 
control elements for the desired SOF capability. 
In their thesis, Porkoláb and Bári propose a command and control 
relationship for HUNSF that places the HDF 34th SF Battalion under the direct 
command of the Defense Staff and suggest a Special Forces Coordination Office 
                                            
114 Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare-Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 262. 
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(SFCO) within the Defense Staff’s Operations and Training Department. The 
SFCO was envisioned to function as a “horizontal integration team” that stretches 
over “functional areas to produce sound, integrated, and adaptive solutions” with 
the section chief reporting directly to the ChoD.115 The SFCO was also to 
“develop strategies and plans for specific problems” and “direct the HUNSF 
capability development process at the manager level and interact with all 
managerial level agencies related to the development process.”116 The authors 
provide an equally detailed description of the SFCO’s role for the cases when 
HUNSF is deployed as part of a larger NATO or EU SOF component.117 
The SOF command structure as envisioned by Porkoláb and Bári is sound 
and the principles described there in terms of national, NATO and EU command 
relationships are still applicable. The limitation, that only the principles are 
applicable, comes from the fact that when their thesis was written in 2006, the 
HDF’s command and control structure was different from what it looks like today. 
In 2007, the Joint Force Command was established in the place of the service 
commands. The Defense Staff was integrated with the MoD and delegated much 
of its previous functions to the JFC that now commands and controls the vast 
majority of the HDF units with the ChoD retaining the direct command of mainly 
support and administrative units. 
The envisioned Special Forces Coordination Office has not been set up in 
the Defense Staff, but a small Special Operations Section was added to the 
JFC’s J3 Operations instead in 2007 as the first step of HUNSF moving toward 
institutionalization. Efforts to establish a permanent SOF representation in the 
MoD Defense Staff have been unsuccessful and the JFC Spec Ops Section was 
                                            
115 Imre Porkoláb and Gábor Bári, Enhancing national security in Hungary through the 
development and employment of Special Forces, MScThesis, Defense Analysis Department, 
Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 88. 
116 Imre Porkoláb and Gábor Bári, Enhancing national security in Hungary through the 
development and employment of Special Forces, MSc Thesis, Defense Analysis Department, 
Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 89. 
117 Imre Porkoláb and Gábor Bári, Enhancing national security in Hungary through the 
development and employment of Special Forces, MSc Thesis, Defense Analysis Department, 
Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 92–96. 
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recently downsized. What seems to follow is that the ideal SOF command 
structure is unlikely to be implemented without broadening our focus of attention 
from the special forces capacity to special operations capacity and the latter 
obtains substantial military leverage.  
For the ChoD to retain the capacity and expertise to directly command and 
control deployed SOF elements and to coordinate the development and support 
of HUNSOF among the agencies of the MoD and beyond, a coordinating and 
advisory body is necessary under the direct supervision of the ChoD. Such a 
section should be able to fulfill the functions of SOF policy making and advising 
the ChoD on SOF issues, and coordinating among the departments and 
agencies of the MoD that are beyond the reach of the JFC commander but still 
are stakeholders in SOF development and employment. The coordinating and 
advisory body would also oversee the public, internal, and international 
communication issues explained in The End of Isolation section of this current 
chapter and manage the strategic level communication and coordination within 
the government and with NATO allies and the EU as applicable. 
The establishment of a capable command control and coordination 
element at the operational level must precede the tactical level unification of 
HUNSOF. This must occur without expanding the organizational structure or 
personnel of the JFC, since that structure is not only the result of military and 
organizational necessities but also of political concerns. The proposed command, 
control and coordination element could be based on the existing structure of 
JFC’s J9 CIMIC branch with the addition of the functions and personnel of the 
current J37 Spec Ops Section.118 This way the HUNSOF capacity could have 
more substantial representation on the strategic and operational level without 
adding another division to the JFC structure and forcing the SOF adhocracy to 
establish its own machine-like branch.  A unique command arrangement, that 
retains the ChoD’s direct command authority for HUNSOF missions on national 
                                            
118 This means that the new JFC J9 SOF would have a CIMIC, a PSYOP, and a SOF 
section. 
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soil, but delegates command to the JFC for peacetime and over deployed units, 
would not distort the joint nature of HDF’s command and control arrangements. 
Moreover, without engaging in details regarding the HDF’s crisis command and 
control structure, the JFC would retain HUNSOF control and coordination for 
possible HDF (non-allied) operations. 
The JFC J9 SOF is not suggested to entirely replace the horizontal 
functional integrating role of JFC’s present Special Operations Working Group 
nor serve as a quasi Special Operations Command (SOCOM), but rather as a 
control and coordination element. The J9 SOF’s first major mission will be the 
preparation of the tactical level SOF unification within the military bureaucracy, 
advancing the capacities of the potential SOF and SOF capable HDF units and 
enhancing the cooperation between those and HUNSF. 
The proposed educational and training program for non-SOF JFC staff 
personnel will aid the prospective JFC J9 SOF by enhancing it with expertise not 
present in its structure. Also, the J9 SOF will not eliminate the need for extensive 
inter-branch coordination and cooperation; neither is the projected education and 
training program a substitute for the suggested J9 SOF. In fact, the execution of 
the program, with its obvious effect in terms of shaping perceptions about 
HUNSOF, is a prerequisite for the creation of J9 SOF.  
There is, however, one element in the J9 SOF’s relationship to the 
command structure of the JFC that is slightly different when compared to the 
other branches. The JFC commander’s already existing advisory staff needs to 
be amended with a SOF advisory body. This element must enjoy the full consent 
of the JFC commander and must be legally empowered to make decisions for the 
JFC commander in order to flatten the SOF chain of command and enable timely 
and lawful decisions in terms of SOF issues. This would somewhat 
institutionalize the present practice of SOF, that was also indicated in the 
empirical research, that seeks out “alternative ways” to engage decision makers 
for the sake of timely decisions and occasionally circumvents the traditional chain 
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of command.119 More direct and timely access to decision makers are inherent to 
SOF and, given that SOF missions increasingly characterize the HDF, could be 
relatively easily justified. At the same time, this arrangement would save 
HUNSOF from being placed under the commander of the conventional land 
forces and also from being managed along the same lines with the conventional 
land forces.120 
2. Force Structure: Similis Simili Gaudet 
The SOF capacity of the HDF is currently fractioned; elements of actual 
and potential SOF are dispersed and assigned to a number of units. For the HDF 
to possess a potent SOF capability, as opposed to simply a SF unit, the capable 
elements need first to be turned into conscious SOF or SOF capable units and 
then organized into one single unit. The potential benefits of uniting SOF include 
unity of tactical command and control, combined CS and CSS capacity, the 








                                            
119 Shortened chain of command, or flattened hierarchy, that is required in the case of SOF 
as the rule and not the exemption has also been a major source of content toward HUNSF. 
During the interviews of the survey a fair number of the subjects commented on their responses 
with regard to whether HUNSF bends rules and follows the regulations more or less than other 
HDF units. The comments, when voiced, tended to be along the lines of “they do but have no 
other choice” and “they are forced to do so,” because the bureaucracy just cannot cope with the 
pace of HUNSF’s development and the characteristics of SOF combat missions. Blaming the 
“bureaucracy” would be a cheap argument, since it can do, by design, only certain tasks with 
efficiency and struggles with the ones that are misfits in its structure. 
120 The recent organizational adjustment of the JFC empowered the JFC DCOMs with the 
command functions of the land, air and logistics forces respectively. Without the suggested 
command arrangement, J9 SOF would most likely fall under the conventional command of DCOM 
Land Forces. This would raise the very issues the present proposal is trying to mitigate. 
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representation and leverage and, most importantly, a clear-cut and unified SOF 
capability in the place of the one that currently exists mostly on paper and is 
reduced to HUNSF.121 
The proposed combined special operations unit incorporates, at least, the 
Special Forces, the ranger type light infantry and the civil-military cooperation 
and psychological operations capabilities that are currently organized into 
separate units. Since special operations take place in complex and unstable 
environments, a habitual training relationship between SOF elements is a 
necessity.122 The arrangement of these units into a single special operations unit 
could provide the HUNSOF, apart from the benefits listed above, with increased 
status at both the individual and the organizational level. This status and the 
differentiation from non-SOF units must also be plainly visible to the individual 
and in the naming of the unit. Moreover, a combined SOF unit would provide the 
SOF elements with their due status within the Special Operations Forces and the 
HDF with the much-needed SOF capacity. The proposal of such unit is, 
nonetheless, very likely to be met with resistance, since its implementation would 
hurt interests. 
First, actors such as unit commanders and supporters of the directly and 
indirectly involved organizations could see the resulting increased status of SOF 
as a zero-sum game that is about resources and status. The argument may go 
that the involved individual units will most likely be worse off in terms of their 
                                            
121 In the past four years, the HDF has been involved in three SOF missions in two theaters: 
Military Advisory and Liaison Teams in Iraq, Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams and 
Special Operation Task Units in Afghanistan. Additionally, one could argue whether the 
deployment of a Close Protection Team to the Kabul International Airport was a SOF mission, 
given that there was no conventional asset available for the task. Another advisory and training 
mission is projected to take place in Africa in 2011 and, since there seems to be an ever-
increasing demand for SOF in the present security environment, it is very probable that a Special 
Operations Task Group will be deployed soon after its NATO SOF Evaluation scheduled for the 
second half of 2010. Also, though the majority of these listed missions were performed solely by 
HUNSF, not all of these are SF missions. Some of them could be performed by other SOF or as 
joint, SF and other SOF, missions. This, however, requires a joint HUNSOF capacity. 
122 Among the many factors that lead to the failure of Operation Eagle Claw, as discussed in 
Chapter III, the absence of such habitual training relationships was imperative, especially since 
exaggerated secrecy further limited the extent and quality of the ad hoc, pre-mission training 
between the forces of different services involved. 
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ability to draw resources and represent their interests when combined into one 
single unit. This perceived threat could be countered by the careful and 
coordinated crafting of the proposed SOF unit’s command structure and its 
founding document. The initial process, although prepared by the JFC J9 SOF, 
will most likely not produce perfection at once; hence, the option for planned 
annual revisions must be intentionally left open and the first permanent structure 
introduced only after one or two such revisions. The regulation of the unit 
commander’s rotation may also be an option for consideration. 
Second, the ranger-type HDF unit is currently subordinated to an infantry 
brigade as a consequence of the last larger reorganization of the HDF. That 
reorganization occurred amid the renaissance of the “light (armored) infantry 
conception,” from which point of view the incorporation of the ranger-type Light 
Mixed Infantry Battalion into a light infantry brigade seemed justifiable. The 
wording “light” has since silently disappeared from the names of the HDF infantry 
brigades and the light armored infantry conception has also been abandoned as 
the overarching idea. Apart from this consideration, the ranger-type unit itself is in 
need to fully develop the required SOF organizational culture before the 
unification can take place.123 Nonetheless, the light infantry concept may well be 
somewhat revitalized by the proposed SOF unification.124 
Third, a single SOF unit may seem, from an individual point of view, to 
decrease career achievement opportunities. This is a legitimate concern given 
that the contributing units have distinct apexes while the proposed unit will have 
                                            
123 A favorable move to this desired direction has been made with the appointment of the 
former deputy commander of the 34th SF Bn as the ranger battalion’s commanding officer. 
124 Luttwak’s argument with regard to the attrition and relational-maneuver approach to 
warfare is already mentioned in a previous chapter in the context of organizational design theory. 
In the same essay, Luttwak suggests two alternatives for the U.S. Special Forces as the force on 
the relational-maneuver end of the spectrum to become a meaningful asset. The one finally not 
chosen by the USASF was “a broader framework in which Special Forces would naturally fit and 
from which it could draw support: a light infantry branch whose several divisions—much needed 
in any case—would have a pronounced relational-maneuver orientation and which would be 
outer-regarding by nature.” 
 
Edward N. Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare,” Parameters (U.S. Army War College) XIII., 
no. 4 (December 1983): 11–18, 16–17. 
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just one. This argument cannot be fully countered; however, the proposed 
combined SOF unit will need a capable and overstaffed headquarters element 
that can support both the everyday running of the unit and provide for the key 
headquarters elements of the deployed special operations components. 
Moreover, the adjoining organizational adjustments in the SOF command and 
control, given the lack of SOF trained and educated senior officers and NCOs on 
the operational and strategic level explained in the previous sections, will not 
decrease but add to the SOF career opportunities even if the “bureaucratic 
guerrillas” program is executed. 
There are inherent dangers to SF and SOF attributes in the process of the 
implementation of the above changes. First, without the consensus of all SF and 
SOF involved the implementation is likely to be malicious and resemble a 
prisoners’ dilemma. The unilateral departure from what has been agreed on (and 
what could provide the best outcome for all parties concerned) can result in the 
best possible outcome for individuals or individual elements of the agreement. By 
the very nature of the prisoners’ dilemma, where the players are deprived of 
communication, this can be only resolved if not executed as a prisoners’ dilemma 
but with constant and honest communication between the parties.125 
                                            
125 Axelrod and Hamilton applied game theory for analyzing interactions between (primitive) 
organisms, ad decribed the Prisoner’s Dilemma as follows: “Many of the benefits sought by living 
things are disproportionally available to cooperating groups. While there are considerable 
differences in what is meant by the terms ‘benefits’ and ‘sought,’ this statement, insofar as it is 
true, lays down a fundamental basis for all social life. The problem is that while an individual can 
benefit from mutual cooperation, each one can also do even better by exploiting the cooperative 
efforts of others. Over a period of time, the same individuals may interact again, allowing for 
complex patterns of strategic interactions. Game theory in general, and the Prisoner's Dilemma 
game in particular, allow a formalization of the strategic possibilities inherent in such situations. 
The Prisoner's Dilemma game is an elegant embodiment of the problem of achieving mutual 
cooperation, and therefore provides the basis for our analysis. […] In the Prisoner's Dilemma 
game, two individuals can each either cooperate or defect. The payoff to a player is in terms of 
the effect on its fitness (survival and fecundity). No matter what the other does, the selfish choice 
of defection yields a higher payoff than cooperation. But if both defect, both do worse than if both 
had cooperated. 
 
”Robert M. Axelrod and William D. Hamilton, "The evolution of cooperation," Science (American 
Association for the Advancement of Science) 211, no. 4489 (March 1981): 1390–1396, 1391. 
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Moreover, sequencing matters in the implementation process, as do each 
elements of the proposal. Establishing the JFC J9 SOF without subsequently 
unifying the tactical level SOF elements is meaningless for the HUNSOF capacity 
that is the ultimate goal. A prematurely unified HUNSOF without the necessary 
organizational culture and its relevant representation at the operational and 
strategic level is even worse. The JFC J9 would not have a chance to prepare 
the bureaucratic and legislative environment for the unification, and the new unit 
would not be able to resist the conventional military’s natural management 
attempts. As a result, the HUNSOF capacity would become a conventional 
asset—losing its delicate attributes in the process. Without crating a generally 
understanding and permissive environment by the implementation of the 
education and training program, the attempts to unify all parties would most likely 
be seen as acts of “cowboys” in pursuit of individual rather than organizational 
HDF interests. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The shift from HUNSF to HUNSOF is necessary, because, from the HDF’s 
point of view, HUNSOF can have more utility as a complete package. This SOF 
capability can also potentially add to stated national interests in terms of 
homeland defense and by contributing to the allied commitments and obligations 
in a security environment where there seems to exist an ever-increasing need for 
SOF as inter-state conflicts are being replaced by non-state-specific asymmetric 
threats. The HUNSOF capacity is also in the best interest of HUNSF, since—by 
extending the capacity—the leverage and status of all concerned parties expand 
and this expansion creates more favorable conditions for HUNSOF development 
and employment. 
The elements of the shift to HUNSOF include more open, targeted and 
proportionate communications on primarily the public and internal spheres. The 
goal is to explain HUNSOF capabilities and limitations in order to combat 
ambiguity and lack of understanding. The unification of the major SOF 
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components on the tactical level and the adjustments to the present command 
and control relationships must be preceded by the educational and organizational 
exposure of select non-SOF JFC and MoD staff personnel to HUNSOF. Such 
interaction will create the environmental conditions, an assortment of active and 
committed SOF-educated supporters within the military’s relevant segment, 
which are necessary but not sufficient for SOF unification and command and 
control arrangements. The implementation of these changes and adjustments 
has the potential of spoiling the distinctive SF organizational values; hence, the 
proposed transformation must be based upon consensus. The planning and 
execution processes need to address both the most and the least obvious 
individual and organizational concerns and possible adverse consequences of 
the arrangements. 
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A. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
The initial hypotheses of the present thesis were tested by the study of 
SF’s historical evolution, organizational design theory, and by conducting 
empirical research throughout the bureaucratic environment of HUNSF. The 
findings of the theory research and the statistical and quantitative analysis of the 
collected data largely correlate with the expectations and the model that 
describes the causal mechanisms among the independent and dependent 
variables.  
The most significant result of the statistical analysis is that increasingly 
corresponding military values between the conventional military’s bureaucratic 
environment and that of HUNSF’s are the factor that increases the 
permissiveness of HUNSF’s immediate operating environment the most. At the 
same time, the research found HUNSF’s perceived attitude toward the 
conventional military disrespectful, and this has a remarkable adverse effect on 
the permissiveness of the bureaucratic environment. Contrary to the 
expectations, organizational exposure to HUNSF was also found to have a 
negative impact on the environment, while educational exposure proved to be 
also negative, though statistically insignificant. 
Based on the research and contrary to the unstated expectations, the 
bureaucratic environment appears to be generally receptive to an increased 
interaction with and is essentially approving of HUNSF—and not only appreciates 
its unique attributes, but also would like to see some of those advanced in the 
HDF. From this perspective, HUNSF can be utilized as a vehicle for fostering the 
long-desired paradigm shift in terms of military organizational culture. 
The research also ascertained that the discrimination between special 
forces/operations and conventional forces/operations is based on speculative 
rather than informational and educational grounds. Moreover, the secretiveness 
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that has characterized HUNSF since its formation, as affirmed by the research, 
has also disabled the flow of information on HUNSF. The research could not 
clearly validate the assumption that this lack of adequate information contributes 
to the low perceived utility of HUNSF as an HDF capability. Nevertheless, it is 
probably reasonable to say that one cannot form an informed judgment without 
sufficient and accurate information. 
B. THE CONSEQUENCES OF HISTORICAL EXAMPLES AND THE 
ANALYSIS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: MINOR CHANGES FOR MAJOR 
IMPROVEMENTS 
Deduced from the historical examples of SOF evolution and the study of 
organizational design theory, the second stage of SOF development must focus 
on the consolidation of the capability. This consolidation must be guided by the 
analysis of and the adaptation to HUNSF’s immediate organizational or 
bureaucratic environment. 
Since alignment of the military organizational values was found the most 
significant in the empirical research, HUNSF needs to influence these values in 
the bureaucratic environment to have them more aligned with those of HUNSF. 
Traditionally, education and experience are the vehicles of value forming. 
Henceforth, increased and deliberate informational, organizational and 
educational exposure to SOF is desired for which the present thesis offers 
methods and programs. Given that the respective results of the empirical 
research suggest a general receptiveness in the HDF for HUNSF and what it 
represents, the investment into these programs does not appear to require huge 
efforts, but promise considerable returns. The execution of these programs must 
be paralleled by HUNSF displaying a more respectful attitude toward the 
conventional military. 
The other aspect of the consolidation is that of securing substantial 
leverage and becoming an inevitable capacity of the HDF. Given that the HDF is 
small in size and joint in terms of operational level command and control and has 
a limited capacity to project CS and CSS, HUNSF is unlikely to become a 
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separate and self-sustaining service of the HDF with a distinct SOCOM-like 
command and control arrangement. Moreover, in its current form, HUNSF cannot 
secure substantial and sustainable leverage on either the operational or the 
strategic level. For leverage to be achieved and dependence on individual 
influential sponsors to be replaced by institutionalized sponsorship, the present 
special forces capacity must be broadened into a SOF capacity, and attempts 
must be made to adjust the current command and control arrangements to the 
necessities of the prospective HUNSOF. 
The suggested adjustments include the establishment of a coordinating 
and advisory body at the strategic level, as well as turning the existing JFC J9 
CIMIC into a SOF branch with somewhat unique command arrangements. These 
command and control elements would then unify all of HDF’s SOF capability at 
the tactical level and provide this capacity with adequate status and 
representation from the tactical to the strategic level. More importantly, the 
suggested changes would also support the unity of effort necessary for turning 
the present dispersed HDF SOF potentials into a meaningful SOF capability for 
which there seems to be an ever-increasing demand. 
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APPENDIX A:  SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
A. Definitions 
HUNSF: In the conduct of this interview, HUNSF refers to the HDF 34th 
Special Forces Battalion, the Joint Force Command J3 Spec Ops section, and 
other military personnel directly associated with the development of the HDF’s 
SOF capacity. 
B. Interview questions 
 
1. How long have you been in your current position? 
 
 
2. In what branch have you served the longest period prior to the 
current appointment? 
 
3. Have you been deployed to any combat mission? 
Yes No 
If you answered Yes: Have you ever worked with national or other 
Special Operations Forces? 
National Other SOF No 
 
4. If you had to recall one single occasion when you first 
heard/learnt something significant about SOF, what would it be? 
 
5. To what extent has education on SOF been part of your military 
training and education? (1: none; 7: very significant) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
6. What type of education have you received on special operations 
and SOF? Please leave it blank if you have not received such 
education. 
Course(s) Seminar(s) Graduate classes 
 
7. How often do you or the branch under your jurisdiction interact 
with HUNSF related issues? (1: never; 7: every day) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 90
 
8. To what extent do you think the following characteristics describe 
HUNSF? (1: not at all; 7: completely) 
a. High level of training 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
b. High-tech hardware 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
c. Superior leadership 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
d. Secrecy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
e.   Well-connected in the highest level military leadership 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
f.    Despise of non-HUNSF units and/or personnel 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
g.   Hardworking personnel in the 34th SF Bn 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
h.   Dedicated advocates within the MoD and the JFC 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
i.    HUNSF bends rules 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
9. What do you think the main difference is between special 
operations/special forces and conventional operations/forces? 
 
 
10. Do you think that special operations can be conducted by 
conventional forces? 
Yes Some ops can, others cannot. No 
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11. What do you think the core tasks of HUNSF are? 
a. Direct Actions 
b. Special Reconnaissance 
c. Training and mentoring of allied military or paramilitary forces 
d. C/SAR 
e. Military Assistance 
f. Counter-Insurgency 
g. Counter-Terrorism 
h. Irregular/Unconventional Warfare 
i. Operations with significant strategic military and/or political impact 
 
12. Of the following organizational values which ones do you think 
are the most important for the military as a whole? 
Respect Competency Ambition 
Diversity Service Individuality 
Loyalty Responsibility Equality 
Credibility Accuracy Integrity 
Honesty Excellence Dedication 
Quality Accountability Improvement 
Discipline/Order Friendliness Innovativeness 
Rules/Regulations Learning Efficiency 
Wisdom Courage Challenge 
Authority Accomplishment Independence 
Dignity Dependability Flexibility 
Compliance Optimism Collectivism 
Influence Collaboration Teamwork 
 
13. To what extent do you think the ones you have chosen are valid 
for the HDF? (1: not at all; 7: completely) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
14. Of the most important organizational values of the military you 
have indicated which ones do you think HUNSF should 
adapt/foster more? 
15. Of the following organizational values which ones do you think 
HUNSF regards the most? 
Respect Competency Ambition 
Diversity Service Individuality 
Loyalty Responsibility Equality 
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Credibility Accuracy Integrity 
Honesty Excellence Dedication 
Quality Accountability Improvement 
Discipline/Order Friendliness Innovativeness 
Rules/Regulations Learning Efficiency 
Wisdom Courage Challenge 
Authority Accomplishment Independence 
Dignity Dependability Flexibility 
Compliance Optimism Collectivism 
Influence Collaboration Teamwork 
 
 
16. Of HUNSF’s most important organizational values you indicated, 
which ones do you think the whole military should adapt/foster 
more? 
 
17. Do you think that HUNSF believes special translates as better? 
(1: don’t agree at all; 7: completely agree) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
18. Do you think that HUNSF disregards the conventional military? 
(1: don’t agree at all; 7: completely agree) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
19. Do you think that HUNSF “plays by the book” as the rule or as the 
exemption? 
(1: doesn’t play by the book at all; 4: no difference compared to other 
HDF units; 7: plays completely by the book). 





20. The proportion of HUNSF in the HDF combat troops is about 3% 
(given that the HDF combat troops number about 10,000). If you 
had to take an educated guess, where would you put the 
percentage of the national financial and materiel resources that 
are allocated for HUNSF development compared to the annual 




21. If you had to take an educated guess, where would you put the 
percentage of the allied financial and materiel resources that are 
allocated for HUNSF development compared to the annual non-
national resources the HDF receives? 
 % 
 
22. Do you think that the above estimates are proportionate to the 
military and political utility of HUNSF? 
(1: don’t agree at all; 7: completely agree) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
23. Do you think that HUNSF tries to recruit valuable human 
resources from the HDF? (1: don’t agree at all; 7: completely agree) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
24. Do you think that the resources that are allocated for HUNSF 
could produce more political return on investment if they were 
devoted to some other capabilities of the HDF? 
(1: don’t agree at all; 7: completely agree) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
25. Do you think that the resources that are allocated for HUNSF 
could produce more return on investment militarily if they were 
devoted to some other capabilities of the HDF? 
(1: don’t agree at all; 7: completely agree) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
26. How integral do you think HUNSF is to the functioning of the 
HDF? 
(1: not integral at all, 7: indispensable) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
27. Do you think the capacity (not the personnel) of HUNSF should be 
increased or decreased for the optimal functioning of the HDF? 
(1: should be disbanded, 4: current form sufficient, and 7: should be 
increased) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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28. What capabilities do you think should be preferred in the place of 
HUNSF? 
a. Airlift (RW and/or FW) 
b. Air assault (RW) 
c. Conventional assets (MBTs, artillery, APCs, AT, air defense, 
etc.) 
d. Intelligence collection and exploitation means 
e. Information and communication technology 
f. Morale and Welfare 
g. CS and CSS capacity 
h. Land transportation means 
i. Other (please specify) 
j. None, as HUNSF is an important capability of the HDF 
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APPENDIX B: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEY 
DATA126 
A. DATA TESTING 
The following tables and figures are excerpts from the STATA software-
generated data analysis results. The coding “relatt” refers to the first proxy 
dependent variable (HDF’s relative attitude toward HUNSF) that is used in the 
statistical model for the data analysis in Chapter IV. 
 
Figure 6.   Residual analysis: Kernel density test 
 
                                            
126 For the statistical analysis the Stata Corporation’s Stata/SE 10.0 for Macintosh and the 
Microsoft Excel 2008 for Mac Version 12.2.4 (100205) software were used. 
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Table 13.   Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of DV1 (relative 
attitude toward HUNSF) 
B. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
                                            Source SS df MS Number of 
observations 
21 
    F(5, 15) 4.67 
                                            Model 1.466 5 0.293 Prob > F 0.0091 
                                            Residual 0.943 15 0.062 R-squared 0.6087 
  20  Adj R-squared 0.4782 
                                            Total 2.41  20.12 Root MSE 0.25076 
      
HDF’s relative attitude toward HUNSF Coefficient Std. error t P>|t| Beta 
      
Subjects’ operational exposure to SOF  -0.033 0.024 -1.39 0.186 -0.251944 
Subjects’ educational exposure to SOF -0.063 0.042 -1.48 0.16 -0.2622533 
Subjects’ organizational exposure to HUNSF -0.001 0.011 -0.08 0.937 -0.0160903 
HUNSF’s perceived attitude toward HDF -0.094 0.036 -2.62 0.019 -0.4434 
Degree of mil. org. value alignment  0.074 0.031 2.37 0.031 0.3891057 
Constant 1.893 0.304 6.22 0 . 
Table 14.   The model’s regression analysis 
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APPENDIX C: INFORMATION-SHARING PROPOSAL OUTLINE 
The HDF Web site intended for the public may have at least two functions. 
First, inform, beyond sheer “public relations” in a way that is easily digestible, on 
how public funds are spent in defense and emphasize the public utility of that 
spending; second, assist recruitment for the military. For informational and 
recruitment purposes, HDF activities that have the potential to attract 
considerable attention could and should also be covered here, not only by 
professional journalists, but by military personnel with boots on the ground. 
This proposed Web site, which could be based on the present HDF site 
and elements of MoD’s site, need target mainly the young adults and the active 
(daily) Internet users. The site will have to adapt to these users’ demands and 
expectations in terms of user friendliness. The full range of Web 2.0 
applications—to include the opportunity for leaving feedbacks on news, events, 
recruitment process and experiences, etc.—is a must in this case. The 
management of the site needs to be innovative and responsive to upkeep on the 
desired amount of visits, or “hits,” on the Web site. 
The MoD and HDF should be responsible for collecting the credits for 
military stories of mass interest. Such news and events should be published on 
the military’s own Web sites, rather than leaving this sort of journalism to other 
media whose accounts may not be accurate. Content that is contributed by non-
professional journalists, but professional service members, can well serve this 
purpose. Also, should it come to less favorable news or stories, the MoD and the 
HDF has more chance to frame them by covering them in detail. Leaving such 
items to other sources that, in their legitimate attempt to satisfy public interest, 
may come up with inaccurate reporting, that does more harm to the military than 
the other option would. Attempts at cover-ups is certainly not a viable option in 
the age of mass communication, where everyone is a potential “strategic 
corporal” with his or her mobile media devices and access to the Internet. 
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The English language site designed for the international audience could 
give a detailed oversight on the military, its mission, organization and structure. 
Such a Web site would obviously be organized around general and actual 
subjects that are rooted in the military’s international and allied engagements. 
These could include conference proceedings, diplomatic level visits and the 
activity of deployed military units. Such a Web site would require somewhat less 
strict oversight, as interactivity is not as desirable here as in the previous case. 
Third, the military’s internal communication also requires a considerable 
change—not in terms of paradigm, but in deeds. The paradigm with regard to 
both internal information management and openness has already changed. This 
can be noticed in the pragmatism of the following excerpt from HDF JFC 
Commander Lieutenant General Benkő’s opening memorandum published on 
the MoD’s internal Web site called Dialogue: 
As a first thought, I am asking for your cooperation with the 
intention of realizing our goals and tasks with responsibility and on 
the grounds of common understanding. To achieve this, we must 
dedicate special attention to our own internal communication, which 
is one of the most significant elements of modern command, control 
and coordination. This internal communication means the exposure 
of our work—and profession-related remarks, thoughts and 
suggestions, and an honest flow of information—in sum, the 
dialogue itself [translation by the author].127 
These sentences are very well aligned with Bok’s observations on actual publicity 
discussed in Chapter V. Interestingly enough, the JFC Commander’s above 
intent needs merely one thing for it to become a very strong encouragement for 
MoD and HDF personnel to actively participate in both public and internal 
communication. The intent needs to be widely and credibly communicated.  
 
 
                                            
127 Lieutenant General Tibor Benkő, Magyar Honvédség Összahaderőnemi Parancsnokság 
(Hungarian Defense Forces Joint Force Command), 
https://www.parbeszed.hm.gov.hu/portal/server.pt?open=512&objID=246&parentname=Communi
tyPage&parentid=3&mode=2&in_hi_userid=339145&cached=true (accessed March 9, 2010). 
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Encouragement, however, may not be a particularly easy task, given that five 
years ago there was a serious blow to the very notion the JFC Commander is 
now trying to advance in his intent.128 
The present Dialogue Web site can be an outstanding vehicle for the 
desired internal communication by becoming more user-friendly, interactive and 
unique in content. User-friendliness is a matter of structuring the content and 
making it visually attractive. This needs expertise, but virtually no additional 
funding or hardware. Another aspect of user-friendliness is maintaining security 
that also enables responsible conduct on the Web site by the virtue of the fact 
that positive identification (registration) is currently required to access the site. 
This very fact largely diminishes the risk of the site being frequently visited by 
“hooligans” or adversaries whose “contribution” is neither desired nor welcome. 
As for the content of the proposed enhanced Dialogue site, it needs to 
become a platform for military academia and scientific research. This suggestion 
is not as far-fetched as it may sound, since the military has several journals and 
periodicals. These, however, have an unduly limited distribution, accessibility 
and, henceforth, audience. It is opined that this is mainly due to the fact that 
                                            
128 The history of the HDF Dialogue Portal goes back to 2005 when an Army captain 
addressed what he considered legitimate concerns with regard to the functioning of the HDF and 
the materiel and non-materiel support of the HDF’s first unit deployed under ISAF command. The 
captain published these concerns in a memorandum to the Minister of Defense on the HDF’s 
official Web site’s Forum section. The memo generated massive waves of, often obscene, 
comments; the Forum was subsequently shot down some weeks later. The Forum, though, did 
not cease to exist but migrated to another, non-MoD Web site and has been alive since. 
The HDF, maybe in lieu of the shot-down Forum, initiated the Dialogue process that, at first, was 
organized around real-life conferences on different organizational levels and pay grades. Later 
on, the MoD-sponsored Dialogue Portal kicked off on the Internet and it has been active to date 
with very limited signs of interactivity from users, who are now required to register with their SSN 
to access the site. 
 
Szabó József Bartha, A százados levele Afganisztánból – ribillió a vezérkarban és a 
minisztériumban (The Captain's letter from Afghanistan-Scandal in the General Staff), 25 
February, 2005, http://www.gondola.hu/cikkek/40787 (accessed March 11, 2010). 
 
[origo], Ügyészségi vizsgálat az afganisztáni misszió miatt (JAG investigates the Afghanistan 
mission), March 3, 2005, http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20050303azugyeszsegre.html (accessed 
March 11, 2010). 
 
Gyula Haraszti and Dávid Kaposi, A katonai ügyészség cáfolja a bírálatokat (JAG refuses 
criticisms), June 30, 2005, http://www.mno.hu/portal/293314 (accessed March 11, 2010). 
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these journals are produced in print and only recently are available online in 
downloadable portable document format (pdf). This thesis suggests that every 
journal and periodical should be made available on the Dialogue site in HTML 
and made interactive by providing an opportunity to comment on the individual 
essays, research papers, reports, etc. This, again, would add to both the 
achievement of the Commander’s intent in terms of “exposure of our work—and 
profession-related remarks, thoughts and suggestions and an honest flow of 
information” and the Bok test of “actual publicity” manifested in carefully crafted 
arguments, revealing the reasoning and offering space for counterarguments and 
counter-counterarguments. 
The above proposals seem to be fully aligned with the goals of the internal 
communication as articulated by Lieutenant General Benkő, even though his 
address concerns the HDF only: 
The goal of our communications through the Dialogue Web site is 
twofold. On the one hand, the objective here is to convey credible 
information and a realistic picture on the functioning and the 
organization [of the JFC], and to effectively depict the social and 
professional circumstances of the military society as well as the 
actual condition of our organizational values and the evolution of 
the organizational culture. On the other hand, the goal is also to 
provide opportunities for the visitors [of the Web site] to express 
their views with regard to a variety of issues affecting the service 
members and, thereby, enable the visitors to become engaged in 
the shaping and realization of our efforts and goals [translation by 
the author].129 
What follows is that the Dialogue site needs to be interactive; the site must 
host both user-initiated and offered-subject blogs and discussion topics relevant 
to the military in order to be in accordance with the Commander’s intent.130  
                                            
129 Lieutenant General Tibor Benkő, Magyar Honvédség Összahaderőnemi Parancsnokság 
(Hungarian Defense Forces Joint Force Command), 
https://www.parbeszed.hm.gov.hu/portal/server.pt?open=512&objID=246&parentname=Communi
tyPage&parentid=3&mode=2&in_hi_userid=339145&cached=true (accessed March 9, 2010). 
130 For a detailed account on the prospective role of blogs in military information strategy 
see: Dorothy Denning and James Kinninburgh, "Blogs and Military Information Strategy," Joint 
Special Operations University, June 2006: 1–31. 
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